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The common law "at will"presumption in employment contracts of un-
specified duration reflects the nineteenth century ideology prevalent at
the time of its judicial adoption. Piecemeal exceptions to that presump-
tion, coupled with pervasive statutory regulation of the workplace, re-
quire a reevaluation of employee and employer rights and obligations.
In this Article, Professor Leonard suggests that state courts should de-
velop a new presumption, which would require employers to advance a
plausible justification for terminating employees who have passed a rea-
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sonable probationary period. Professor Leonard discusses recent devel-
opments in Montana as an illustration of the interrelationship of
common law development and statutory reform.
"Courts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its
touch with reality and should beabandoned or reformulated to meet new condi-
tions and new moral values." '
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have brought significant change and uncertainty to com-
mon-law principles governing employment termination. The employment at
will rule that came into general acceptance around the turn of the last cen-
tury2 - providing that an employment agreement of unspecified duration is pre-
sumed to be terminable without penalty or notice by either the employer or
employee for any or no reason 3-has experienced great erosion, leaving uncer-
tainty and wide variations in law between the states.
4
Federal and state legislation specifying forbidden motivations for discharge,
such as race, sex, religion or national origin,5 age,6 union activity,7 application
for workers compensation benefits, 8 or jury service,9 laid the groundwork for
undermining the common-law rule. These laws sometimes provide an adminis-
trative forum to challenge an unlawfully motivated discharge, and reinstatement
is a potentially appropriate remedy.' 0 These statutes challenge both the tradi-
1. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232.
2. The earliest judicial statements of the rule usually are cited as Martin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) and Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884),
overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
3. See H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
4. The New York City metropolitan area provides a prime example of the sharply contrasting
state laws on employee termination. The New Jersey and Connecticut Supreme Courts have recog-
nized a variety of common law exceptions to the at will presumption, while the New York Court of
Appeals, except for a very limited contractual exception which may be sui generis to the one case in
which it was applied, has refused to recognize any common law exception. See Magnan v. Ana-
conda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984) (discharge without just cause does not of
itself breach any duty of good faith in an at will employment); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (discharge that contravenes public policy actionable in tort);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d
515 (1985) (job security provision in personnel manual enforceable; employee's reliance presumed);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1982) (discharge that contravenes
public policy is actionable in tort); Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919,
514 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1987) (rejecting exception to at will presumption based on personnel manual or
contravention of public policy); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (narrow contractual exception to at will presumption recognized when guaran-
tees of job security, backed up by personnel manual, were made at time of hiring and reiterated
during dischargee's employment).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); e-g., N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(a) (McKinney 1982).
6. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
8. E.g., N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
9. E-g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
10. For example, the Labor Management Relations Act provides an administrative process for
dealing with allegations that discharges violate federal labor relations law, and authorizes reinstate-
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tional presumption of terminability at will and the traditional restriction against
ordering specific performance of employment agreements. Most of the pertinent
legislation was enacted during the New Deal period (in the case of federal labor
and employment law) 1 or the years '1960-1975 (in the case of civil rights and
related protective labor legislation).1 2 In addition, the organization of substan-
tial numbers of employees into labor unions1 3 which negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements setting a just cause standard for employment termination
and establishing a nonjudicial mechanism (neutral binding arbitration) for en-
forcement, marked a major incursion in the at will regime.14
Another important legislative development affecting job security was the
move to guarantee accumulated employee rights with respect to benefits entitle-
ments. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,15
which set minimum vesting periods1 6 and required that vested benefits be non-
forfeitable,' 7 gave employees a property interest in continued employment by
strengthening legally enforceable interests which related to benefit entitlements.
ERISA also adopted a nonretaliation principle under which employment termi-
nations would be suspect at various identifiable times during an employee's
career. 18
As legislation and union organization have undermined employment at
will, employees have developed new consciousness and expectations about job
security. Unionized employees, never a majority of the workforce but still a sig-
nificant portion, are conscious of their just cause protection, a standard requir-
ment with or without back pay as a remedy. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
§ 10(b), (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
an administrative process for dealing with allegations that discharges violate the nondiscrimination
requirements of federal civil rights law, and authorizes reinstatement with or without back pay as a
remedy. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
11. The National Labor Relations Act, predecessor of the Labor Management Relations Act,
was enacted in 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), and the Fair Labor Standards Act fol-
lowed shortly thereafter, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
12, Already mentioned above are the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which became effective in 1965,
and the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Other pertinent enactments include the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. Ii 1985), the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13. However, this form of protection for job security serves a declining portion of the civilian
labor force, as union penetration has decreased from over a quarter of the civilian labor force in 1953
to under a fifth in 1984. Congressional Research Service Report on Implications for Economic Pol-
icy and Labor Legislation of Decline in Union Membership, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 114, at
D-1, D-12 (June 13, 1986) (reproducing table based on L. TROY & N. SHRFLIN, UNION
SOURCEBOOK 3-18 (1985)) [hereinafter Union Membership].
14. A direct legislative abrogation of at will employment also can be found in federal laws
governing reemployment rights of military veterans. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(1) (1982) provides that
reemployed veterans "shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after
such restoration or reemployment."
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
16. Id. § 1053.
17. Id.
18. Id. §§ 1140, 1141 (1982); e.g., Zipf v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1986) (discharge of employee diagnosed with costly illness raises inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion under § 1140); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa.) (discharge prior to
vesting date under suspicious circumstances may violate 29 U.S.C. § 1140), modified, 719 F.2d 670
(3d Cir. 1983).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing employer justifications based on business reasons. 19 Members of minority
groups know they can mount a legal attack against terminations traceable to
racial or ethnic animosity or otherwise unrelated to their work performance.
Elderly employees no longer need retire solely due to age,20 and employers must
make "reasonable accommodations" to continue employing individuals with
physical or mental impairments 2' or who feel compelled by religious belief to
perform unconventional practices of dress, diet, or Sabbath observance.
22
Legislative entitlements to job security have had an effect on the conscious-
ness not only of those directly protected but also of their families, friends, and
fellow employees. Supervisory employees are aware of restrictions on their abil-
ity to discharge subordinates covered by collective bargaining or statutory pro-
tections. 23 Family and friends of public employees become conscious of the job
security afforded by civil service laws and caselaw expanding constitutional job
protections in the public sector.2 4 Simultaneously, other areas of the law have
evolved to provide greater protection to the working class in other spheres of
their everyday lives. 25 All of these factors undoubtedly have contributed to in-
creased feelings among employees that they have an entitlement to fair treat-
ment in the workplace, particularly regarding job termination.
Employers have encouraged and abetted these feelings. As statutory regula-
tion has become increasingly complex and pervasive, many employers, particu-
larly larger employers, have published personnel manuals setting forth
descriptions of employment benefits and policies, including procedures for em-
ployee discipline and termination.26 As union avoidance has emerged as a sig-
nificant management strategy, voluntary adoption of restrictions on termination
has also become more common. Some employers have constructed internal ap-
19. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 701-02 (10th ed. 1986); see 2 Collective
Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 40:1, at 121 (1986) (grounds for discharge found in 94% of
contracts analyzed); id. § 51:1, at 51 (grievance and arbitration procedures found in 97-100% of
contracts sampled).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), amended by Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342.
21. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 (1987) (Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to "other-
wise qualified" handicapped persons).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982).
23. For example, in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982), the plaintiff, a discharged supervisory employee, alleged he had been instructed
to follow handbook procedures to avoid legal liability of the company in cases in which he recom-
mended subordinates be discharged. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
24. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (comprehensive statutory protections for federal employees); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (due process protects state employees' reasonable expecta-
tion of continued employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (same); see Developments
in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611 (1984); Note, Substantive Due Process.
The Extent of Public Employees' Protection From Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1647
(1974). Because of the special statutory and constitutional protections they enjoy, public sector
employees generally fall outside the main concerns of this Article.
25. During the relevant time period, statutory and common law protection for consumers has
undergone a revolutionary change, as have protections for residential tenants.
26. See Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work. Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis.
L. REv. 733, 742-43. Finkin cites a 1979 survey of 6,000 companies showing about 75% had distrib-
uted employee handbooks, most of which contained personnel policies. Id. at 743 & n.53,
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peals processes, sometimes incorporating decision making by neutral persons. 27
The resulting new consciousness and assertiveness about job security is viv-
idly reflected in the increasing number of lawsuits brought by employees, includ-
ing supervisory and managerial employees, protesting their terminations as
being unfair or unlawful. One can search state case reports prior to the 1970s in
vain for any significant number of cases in which nonunionized employees with-
out written durational employment contracts challenged their discharges. Be-
ginning in the 1970s, however, such challenges became frequent, and the number
had increased enough by the middle of the 1980s to generate specialized law
reporting services28 and a national Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association,
reflecting the development of a new and growing field of practice.
29
The growing number of such cases has been both a stimulus and a response
to increased willingness by state courts to identify exceptions to the presumption
of at will status. The first judicial cracks in the at will citadel involved allega-
tions that a particular discharge decision offended some principle of public pol-
icy. A California decision recognizing such a cause of action during the 1950s
has been identified as one of the earliest influential cases.30 During the 1970s
and 1980s the highest courts of many states agreed to recognize a "public policy
exception" to the at will rule,31 although they differed in the latitude they would
allow in identifying the sources of public policy for determining whether a dis-
charge was actionable. By 1987 a common law public policy exception had be-
come a clear majority rule, with only a few prominent holdouts such as New
York.32 Over sixty percent of the states now recognize an exception grounded
in considerations of public policy, sometimes characterized as a basis for a tort
action, with punitive damages available as a remedy in some cases.
Another widely accepted exception is an implied contract based either on
written statements contained in employee handbooks or oral statements made at
the time of hiring or shortly thereafter, which would lead employees reasonably
to believe that they had job security. The developing caselaw shows a growing
judicial reluctance to let employers enjoy the presumed benefits of such state-
ments without incurring any obligation to abide by them.3 3 By 1987 courts in
more than half the states had recognized an effective rebuttal of the at will pre-
27. See generally Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Dis-
putes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 249 (1983) (proposing a model arbitration agreement for employee
terminations).
28. E.g., Employment At Will Reporter; Individual Employee Rights Cases (BNA).
29. A report by a committee of the American Bar Association's Section on Labor and Employ-
ment Law counted 314 state and federal court employment at will decisions published during 1985, a
37.1% increase over the number of such decisions announced in 1984. These were mainly appellate
decisions, and it is fair to speculate that they represent only a small percentage of the cases actually
filed. See Section on Labor and Employment Law, American Bar Association, Report of the Com-
mittee on Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Workplace, 2 LAB. LAW. 351, 351-52 (1986).
30. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959), aff'd, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
31. See Gould, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Col-
lective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 887 n.6.
32. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919, 514 N:Y.S.2d 209 (1987).
33. See, e.g., Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sumption in such cases. 34 The resulting cause of action is a breach of contract,
with normal contract damages measured by an expectation interest, reduced by
amounts earned in mitigation, as the usual remedy.
A minority of jurisdictions recognize an exception based on an implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing in employment agreements, similar to that
implied in commercial contracts covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, and
consider a breach of such covenant as the basis for a contract or tort action. 35
Significantly, all the judicially adopted exceptions adhere to the traditional com-
mon-law reluctance to order specific performance of employment contracts,
favoring damages as the sole remedy, in contrast to legislative exceptions to the
at will rule that authorize a reinstatement and back-pay remedy.
Despite the rapid spread of the two principal exception theories-public
policy and implied contract-the state courts are reluctant to abandon the un-
derlying concept of a presumption of at will employment. All of the decisions
upholding a cause of action do so within the framework of an exception to an
underlying at will rule. I contend the combination of statutory and common-
law exceptions and the contemporary employment law environment have
evolved to the point where courts would be justified in abandoning the underly-
ing common-law rule and devising a new legal theory of the employment rela-
tionship more congruent with the legal and social environment.
Despite the pervasive statutory regulation of many terms and conditions of
employment-such as compensation, workplace safety, and nondiscrimination
requirements-the formation and termination of private sector employment re-
lationships is still largely a matter of private rather than public law, the Con-
gress and almost all state legislatures having made no move to adopt general
principles governing such transactions.3 6 Characterizing these transactions as
essentially contractual, the courts have approached the problem as one of ana-
lyzing the employment relationship by reference to familiar principles from con-
tract law such as consideration, mutuality of obligation, and express and implied
covenants. But employment does not fit comfortably into the traditional con-
tract scheme, resulting in decisions holding either that executory employment
agreements are unenforceable due to lack of mutuality of obligation or consider-
ation,37 or that the lack of a durational term means the parties presumptively
34. Gould, supra note 31, at 887 n.6.
35. Gould, supra note 31, at 887 n.6. Leading examples of such an implied covenant are found
in the caselaw of Massachusetts, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977), and Montana, see Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d
213 (1983).
36. The principal exception at the time of this writing is Montana. See Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1987); see also ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-310 (1976) (term employee may bring action for wrongful discharge in addition to recovering
lost wages); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1985) (length of service may provide protection against
"discharge without cause").
37. Ironically, although lack of mutuality of obligation is relied upon as a basis for finding
nondurational employment agreements unenforceable, the law of contracts seems largely to have
abandoned the doctrine of mutuality of obligation, if the Second Restatement is any indication. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981); cf J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§ 4-12 (3d ed. 1987) (exceptions and judicial circumvention of rule of mutuality of obligation lend
support to the argument that rule should be abandoned). As to the need for traditional "considera-
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intended to make the agreement terminable without notice at any time.
If one holds to a strictly contractarian analysis of employment agreements,
the lack of a durational term appears to create an important gap. The presump-
tion of at will terminability, if not a requirement due to "lack of mutuality of
obligation," can be seen as essentially a gap-filling device. 38 During the period
straddling the turn of the last century, courts in effect found that the most logi-
cal gap-filler was a presumption of at will terminability. This presumption
seems logical given the surrounding employment law of the period, which was
hostile to collective employee action, worker tort claims for job-related injuries,
and legislative attempts to regulate employment terms.39 In such a relatively
unregulated employment environment, it would have been unlikely that most
employment relationships were formed with some unstated expectation by both
parties that a termination would require advance notice, severance pay, or some
form of legal justification. 40 As such, the presumption was an appropriate gap-
filler at the time the courts adopted it.
The appropriateness of this gap-filler is now in considerable doubt. Em-
ployers and employees form their relationship in an environment laden with
rules and regulations governing most significant aspects of employment. Strict
liability exists for work-related injuries under the workers compensation laws.
41
Statutes guarantee employees the right to engage in concerted activity, to form
unions, and to compel collective bargaining,42 and dictate minimum terms of
compensation 43 and conditions of workplace safety. 44
As noted above, a wide array of reasons for termination of employment
have been statutorily rendered unlawful. Furthermore, many employers present
their newly hired employees with handbooks or policy statements which
strongly imply that discharge will not be undertaken on an at will basis. It
seems unlikely in such an environment that the employer and the employee,
from the outset, share an unspoken presumption that their relationship is termi-
nable at will without advance notice or compensation.
Despite these changes in workplace expectations and numerous proposals,
comments, and recommendations by academic commentators, judges, and or-
ganized bar groups that legislative change would be appropriate, neither the
state legislatures nor Congress has moved to adopt a comprehensive statutory
tion," see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 71 (1981).
38. A prominent defender of the at will presumption sees it as an appropriate gap-filler. Ep-
stein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951-53 (1984).
39. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 127-32 (1976); McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises in
the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. Sup. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 20, 20-33.
40. Indeed, Professor Matthew W. Finkin convincingly shows that at the time the at will rule
was adopted, the right to quit was assumed and highly valued by workers, who would frequently
change jobs to improve their circumstances. Finkin, supra note 26, at 736-43.
41. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ch. 1, § 1.10 (rev. ed. 1985).
42. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
43. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
44. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
1988]
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scheme to replace the common-law at will presumption and attendant growing
caselaw of exceptions. 45 Sorhe reasons for legislative inaction seem obvious: or-
ganized employer groups oppose further legislative restrictions on their freedom
of operation, and no countervailing lobby argues in favor of legislative restric-
tions on employment termination. The organized labor movement understanda-
bly does not make such legislative reform a high priority, as statutory job
protection would remove one of the main benefits that unions offer to potential
members, and could, depending on its administration, decrease the unions' role
as an intermediary and protector of employees already organized.
Some might argue the lack of an organized lobby for statutory job protec-
tion means that it is an idea which the public would on the whole reject, but
there is no evidence that the public has formed a general opinion on the subject.
Perhaps the traditional private-law status of the issue, as one peculiarly individu-
alistic in nature, mitigates against the public agitation necessary for legislative
change. While a statutory approach to employment termination might be prefer-
able to a purely judicial one, primarily because a statute might create an admin-
istrative mechanism for dealing with the resulting litigation,46 apparently most
legislatures are not now ready or willing to act. But the legislatures have not
expressly rejected attempts to act in this area; rather, they have acted piecemeal,
in some cases responding to particular court decisions by enshrining yet another
exception to at will employment.47 These piecemeal solutions have not stemmed
the tide of lawsuits and have helped make employment law extraordinarily com-
plex, especially for employers with multistate operations.
Without legislative guidance, state courts are now groping towards a new
conceptualization of the employment relationship closer to the expectations of
contemporary workers. Starting from contract concepts, they are trying to de-
vise a new gap-filler that comes closer to what the parties might reasonably ex-
pect, had employees and employers consciously articulated their expectations at
the time they formed the relationship or as the relationship developed over time.
We expect the state courts to play this role in dealing with private law disputes:
to identify principles which are congruent with the reasonable expectations of
45. So many articles dealing with unjustified discharge exist that citing them would be superflu-
ous. Perhaps the most significant to urge a legislative change are Gould, supra note 31; Stieber &
Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge. The Needfor a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
319 (1983); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REv. 481 (1976). Also of significance is a special report prepared by a committee of the California
state bar, urging adoption of a statute mandating a just cause standard for employee discharge and
providing an arbitration mechanism to resolve disputes. California State Bar Ad Hoc Comm. on
Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge, To Strike a New Balance: A Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge (special ed., Labor and Employment
Law Newsletter, Feb. 8, 1984). Early in 1988, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws an-
nounced a project to draft a model statute.
46. More than a decade ago Clyde W. Summers urged that it was "time for a statute" on this
subject. Summers, supra note 45. More recently, William Gould argued that ensuing developments
reinforce the need for statutory protection for private sector employees. Gould, supra note 31.
47. The piecemeal approach in New York has resulted in provisions scattered through the
state's legal code forbidding particular reasons for discharge. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney
Supp. 1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(l)(e) (McKinney 1982); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215 (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 75-b
(McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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the parties and the society in which they interact, building on existing bodies of
precedent and theory.
It is unlikely that many employees and employers desire the complicated
array of forums and statutory and common-law exceptions to an underlying rule
of termination at will that constitute employment law in 1988. It also is unlikely
that the views of employers and employees as to the nature of their relationship
remain static over time; surely employees with significant workplace seniority
and accumulated benefits entitlements hold different views about the security of
their jobs from employees who have just been hired or who have not advanced to
vesting of benefits. In addition, the nature of the job and concomitant responsi-
bilities likely influence the views of both employers and employees about the
circumstances under which employment can be terminated. Consequently, it
may be that an appropriate gap-filler is a more general standard of conduct
rather than a per se or presumptive rule such as termination at will.
In this Article I argue that state courts are justified in taking the important
step of adopting a new underlying legal theory for deciding employment termi-
nation disputes. This new underlying theory would build on the implied cove-
nant of good faith that has been adopted as a gloss on the at will presumption in
a few jurisdictions, 48 and also incorporate some of the features of the "status
relation" that characterized precontract employment law.49 A requirement that
termination of employment be undertaken for legitimate reasons related to the
economic needs of the employer and the standard of performance by the em-
ployee based on a notion of reciprocal duties of loyalty within the employment
relation, provides the flexibility courts will need in dealing with a wide variety of
factual situations. This requirement would also provide a substantive standard
that is congruent with the rest of modem American employment law and other
developments in common-law areas directly affecting the daily lives of Ameri-
cans. A remedial scheme should be based on a make-whole remedy for dis-
charged employees which reasonably approximates the actual injuries resulting
from unjustified employment termination. Such a remedy could stimulate more
widespread adoption of severance pay systems that, in the long run, would deter
litigation and assist former employees in carrying on with their lives after dis-
charge. Furthermore, judicial development of a make-whole remedy may stimu-
late state legislatures or the Congress to enact an appropriate mechanism for its
administration, as occurred in Montana in 1987. After examining the develop-
ments in employment law that justify judicial innovation with respect to em-
ployee termination, I will propose the contours of a new rule and suggest ways
in which it could be applied by the courts.
48. See Gould, supra note 31, at 902; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1816-17 & n.6
(1980).
49. For a description of the "status relation" approach of preindustrial employment law, see P.
SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JusTiCE 122-37 (1969).
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II. How THE CURRENT SITUATION AROSE
A. From Adoption of the Common-Law Presumption to the Beginning of the
Modern Turmoil
Prior to adoption of a termination at will presumption around the turn of
the century, some American courts had followed the English rule, which pre-
sumed a yearly hiring if the parties specified no duration and no evidence
showed a contrary intent.50 However, American common law governing the
employment relation during the nineteenth century has been characterized as
exhibiting "a confusion of principles and rules," 5 1 primarily between the old
fields of domestic relations and master and servant.52 By the 1870s contradic-
tory descriptions in a variety of treatises evidenced a multiplicity of approaches
to characterizing the employment relation. 5
3
Horace Gray Wood's 1877 treatise announced a formulation later expressly
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof .... [I]t is an
indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in
this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other
servants.
54
Wood cited several cases for his "inflexible rule," but they do not support an
assertion of an "inflexible rule."' 55 Moreover, the different rules Wood's contem-
porary treatise writers espoused 56 argue against Wood's assertion that his rule
was then established or inflexible.
Neither Wood nor the courts which adopted his rule explain why such a
presumption as to termination would be appropriate.5 7 Why should at will ter-
50. Feinman, supra note 39, at 119-22. Feinman notes that English courts shifted their atten-
tion during the 19th century from the issue of duration to that of notice.
51. Feinman, supra note 39, at 122.
52. Feinman, supra note 39, at 122-24.
53. Feinman, supra note 39, at 123-25. Feinman notes the following treatises: J. SCHOULER,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1874) (stating American rule that the period of payment of wages
raises a presumption as to duration of hiring), W. STORY, CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1874) (also stating a
wage duration presumption, but noting that evidence of intent to create a longer relationship would
override), and H. WOOD, supra note 3 (stating the at will presumption as the "inflexible" American
rule).
54. H. WooD, supra note 3, § 134 (quoted in Feinman, supra note 39, at 126). The New York
Court of Appeals quoted this passage with approval in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y.
117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 418 (1895).
55. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341 n.54 (1974); see
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600-04, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87 (1980);
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 308 & n.1, 448 N.E.2d 86, 93 & n.1, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 239 & n.1 (1983) (Meyer, J., dissenting); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 463 n.5, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 n.5, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 n.5 (1982); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567 n.3, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 n.3 (1983).
56. See supra note 53.
57. Feinman, supra note 39, at 126. The courts were not accustomed to giving theoretical
explanations for the adoption of new common law rules. In Martin the Court spoke as if it was not
adopting a new rule at all, relying on Wood's assertion that the at will presumption was established
in American law. Martin, 148 N.Y. at 121, 42 N.E. at 418.
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mination be the underlying presumption, instead of a duration measured by the
manner of payment? Why not a more flexible approach, as in other areas of
contract law, seeking to infer the intent of the parties from their course of deal-
ing,, other terms of their agreement, or common understandings and trade
usages?
58
Latter-day commentators have speculated on reasons for the at will doc-
trine's eventual triumph as the American rule. The most frequently advanced
explanation is that the rule was an expression of the freedom of contract ethos
characteristic of its time. Arguably, freedom to make contracts includes free-
dom to terminate them unless the parties have expressly bound themselves for a
specified duration.
59
Another reason for the at will presumption might be that the courts were
playing their proper role as developers of the common law by adopting a rule
which reflected the expectations and needs of the employer and employee classes
of the time. In that age laissez-faire was the attitude of government toward in-
dustry, massive immigration had reduced or reversed the historic American
shortage of labor, large-scale industry was developing at a rapid pace, and em-
ployees frequently changed jobs on their own initiative. A policy of according
maximum freedom to employers and employees to dissolve their relationship
probably seemed to the courts an obvious translation of public policy into the
employment sphere.6° Furthermore, such a rule was consistent with the general
approach of the courts toward employment issues.
61
Finally, exponents of the "critical legal studies" approach have argued that
adoption of the rule was, whether consciously or not, part and parcel of the
promotion of industrial capitalism by the courts. 62 At will termination protects
the capitalist's investment by strengthening his control of the workplace. Be-
cause the employer could terminate at will, employees interested in retaining
their jobs were motivated to maintain high productivity. The rule also allowed
employers maximum freedom to upgrade their workforces or lay off workers in
times of reduced need for production.
Although it achieved the dignity of virtually universal adoption and, for
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981) ("Supplying an Omitted
Essential Term. When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed
with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."). As to resort to course of dealing, trade
usages, and other methods of supplying missing terms in commercial contracts, see U.C.C. §§ 2-301
to -308.
59. Some contracts scholars have countered this explanation by observing that the law of con-
tracts, as it emerged in the late 19th century, would not have supported the adoption of an at will
presumption. Instead, it would have supported a rule under which courts would construct a dura-
tional feature based on the other elements of the agreement and whatever could be determined or
inferred as to the intentions of the parties. Feinman, supra note 39, at 129-30.
60. This explanation is developed from a historian's perspective in McCurdy, supra note 39, at
20-33.
61. At the time the at will rule was adopted, collective labor action damaging to an employer
was subject to injunction, employees injured at work could not recover against their employer if a
fellow employee played any role in the accident, and legislative attempts to ameliorate harsh work-
ing conditions were considered unconstitutional by the courts.
62. Feinman, supra note 39, at 131-35; McCurdy, supra note 39, at 20.
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some time, constitutional status,63 legislators eventually judged the at will rule
and its enshrinement of an unregulated labor market to be inadequate to protect
legitimate interests of employees in many instances."4 Recognizing that employ-
ees and employers frequently stand on grossly unequal footing when negotiating
the terms of their relationship, legislators have carved out significant exceptions
to freedom of contract running along two distinct lines: first, encouraging estab-
lishment of collective bargaining so that bargaining over employment terms
would be less one-sided, 65 and second, directly establishing certain minimum
substantive terms and prohibiting certain conduct.
66
As to the former, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 67 and the Wagner Act
68
sought to create an environment in which collective bargaining would replace
individual bargaining for most employees.69 A union charged with the duty to
represent all employees in a bargaining unit would negotiate terms to be con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement.70 Although the individual contract
of employment still would remain, 71 its terms (or presumptions as to its terms)
would be largely supplanted by or taken from the collective agreement.
As to the latter, the Norris-LaGuardia Act abolished enforceability of con-
tract provisions requiring employees to refrain from union membership. The
63. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
64. Virtually every piece of federal labor legislation, beginning with the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932), represented an attempt either to protect human or civil rights or to
change the character of the market by introducing the element of collective action as a counter-
weight to employers' economic power. The legislative judgment that the unregulated market failed
to respect adequately the rights of unrepresented workers is starkly proclaimed in the public policy
provision of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1932), which states that "the individual unorgan-
ized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of
labor ......
65. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
66. Id.; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII (Equal
Employment Opportunities), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
69. By creating a right for employees to join unions, outlawing employer practices opposed to
unions, and imposing a duty on employers to bargain with unions selected by their employees, the
Wagner Act may be characterized as a statute embracing a pro-union philosophy. By adopting a
right for employees to refuse to support and join unions, outlawing various union practices (espe-
cially effective secondary tactics to force unionization on reluctant employers), and redefining the
bargaining duty so as not to require concessions or agreement, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act may be
seen as an attempt to recast federal labor relations law in neutral, rather than pro-union, terms.
70. The Supreme Court derived the duty of fair representation in a series of cases brought
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967) (union has duty to process discharged employee's grievance in good faith);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (union agreement to integrate seniority lines in a merger
situation not a breach of statutory duty); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (union
agreement to contract provision adversely affecting some employees is valid); cf Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (construing Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982), to
require that exclusive bargaining agent provide fair representation to all employees in bargaining
unit, regardless of union membership status or race).
71. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (Wagner Act not intended to displace individ-
ual contract of employment, which remains in effect to extent not displaced by collective agreement).
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Act essentially banned federal injunctions against employee concerted activity. 7 2
The Wagner Act prohibited discharge of employees for engaging in concerted
activity to advance common interests.
73
In the following decades Congress adopted new statutory prohibitions
against termination of employment.74 Some were phrased in terms of protecting
employees who asserted rights conferred by legislation.7 5 Thus, employees
could not be discharged for pursuing wage entitlements under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,76 opposing discriminatory practices under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,77 protesting safety problems under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,78 or claiming benefits due them under
plans subject to ERISA.79 Other statutes identified particular classifications or
statuses that could not be the basis for a discharge, such as race, religion, na-
tional origin, or sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,80 age under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 8 1 or, to a limited extent,
physical or mental handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.82 In addi-
tion to proscribing various motivations for discharge, many of these labor laws
undermined considerably the notion of "freedom of contract" with respect to
employment by sharply circumscribing various terms of the relationship.
83
Both tracks of employment legislation at the federal level have their coun-
72. "Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 1, 3, 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 104 (1982).
73. Wagner Act, § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982), enforcing id. § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157. The Wagner Act also prohibits discharge as retaliation against employees who file complaints
under the Act or participate in Labor Board proceedings. Id. § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
74. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. Prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, some
legislatures attempted to curtail absolute employer freedom to terminate employment, but these at-
tempts often came to grief under prevailing due process doctrine. See, e.g., Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908) (declaring unconstitutional Act of June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 424, which purported
to forbid discharges of railroad employees because of membership in unions).
75. In addition to the protective labor legislation, other statutes frequently contain provisions
forbidding retaliation against employees. See Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment
Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 67 n.10 (1985).
76. § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982).
77. § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
78. § 11(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
79. § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). This section has been interpreted expansively to forbid
discharges motivated by a desire to escape anticipated medical expense claims by employees diag-
nosed with serious but not presently disabling illnesses. See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp.
1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
80. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
81. § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). In 1986 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
amended to forbid mandatory retirement based on age, with a few narrow exceptions pertaining to
specified jobs. Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342.
82. §§ 503-504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1982). Perhaps the newest addition to this nondiscrimi-
nation litany is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which is prohibited by statute in
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31 to .395 (1974 & Supp. 1987), and by local ordinance in many
large cities. See 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 110.30, at 23-47 (1987).
83. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) removes considerable discretion from
the wage bargain by setting a floor under hourly rates and imposing a requirement for extra compen-
sation for overtime hours as specified in the statute. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a), 213 (1982). In
addition, through administrative regulations defining executive, administrative, and managerial ex-
clusions from coverage, the FLSA clearly has influenced the content of jobs. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 541.0-541.602 (1987). Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has
dictated the way in which various employee benefits plans have been structured and administered.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (1982). The Occupational Safety and Health Act and implementing
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terparts in state and local laws.84 Taken together, the federal and state laws have
created an environment of extensive governmental regulation of the terms and
conditions of employment and, at least indirectly, of workplace procedures for
establishing such terms. However, because collective bargaining has failed to
take root as the predominant method of establishing employment conditions,"5
and significant gaps in coverage remain under protective labor legislation,8 6 the
collective impact of these laws on job security has been uneven.
While labor unions have succeeded in obtaining a just cause standard for
employment termination in most collective bargaining agreements, 7 such agree-
ments cover a small and declining portion of the work force. The labor move-
ment has never succeeded in organizing a majority of the civilian work force.
During recent years, union penetration has fallen to its lowest level since the end
of World War II, less than twenty percent, and the decline seems to be continu-
ing.8 8 Furthermore, exclusions from coverage under federal labor law are exten-
regulations have dictated minimum standards for the physical workplace with respect to injury-
causing conditions and exposures to disease-causing agents. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655 (1982).
84. For example, New York has its own "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" prohibiting injunctions
against concerted activity by employees, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807(f)(1 1) (McKinney 1977), and a state
Labor Relations Act covering small employers exempt from the federal law, N.Y. LAB. LAW
§§ 700-717 (McKinney 1977), as well as a public sector Labor Relations Law, N.Y. LAB. LAW
§§ 220-223 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988), thus providing a state counterpart to the National
Labor Relations Act. New York also has a Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988), which provides broader protections against employment discrimi-
nation than the federal Civil Rights Act and related statutes by forbidding discrimination based on
marital status, age (age 18 through death), and, throughout the private and public sectors, physical,
mental, and medical disabilities, broadly defined. New York also has its own version of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, which purports to confer greater informational rights on employees
than does federal OSHA or its implementing regulations. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 27, 27-9 (McKin-
ney 1986).
85. Only 18% of employees belonged to unions in 1985 according to recent Census Bureau
estimates. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1987, at 409, table no. 693 (107th ed.).
86. These gaps in coverage may be illustrated by a recent interpretation of § 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 adopted by the United States Justice Department in dealing with employment
discrimination attributed to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). According to the Jus-
tice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, actual physical impairments attributable to AIDS or
related conditions would bring an employee within the protection of the law, but an employer would
be free to discharge if his good faith motivation was a sincere belief that termination of the employee
was required to avoid spread of the disease (even though Public Health officials contended that such
a belief was not substantiated by medical facts), because § 504 only forbids discharges based solely on
nondisqualifying but actual or perceived impairments. Cooper, Memo on Application of Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 122, at D- I (June 25,
1986). The Supreme Court rejected this approach to the issue of discrimination against persons with
disabling contagious diseases in School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987); see also Chalk v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 832 F.2d 1158, modified, 46 FEP Cases (BNA) 279 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordering reinstatement
of school teacher with AIDS to classroom duty).
In addition to narrow construction, major gaps in coverage occur due to exemptions of various
groups or classes of employees. Thus, supervisory or managerial employees are excluded from pro-
tection under federal labor relations law, and even larger groups are excluded from protection under
wage and hour laws. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (exclusion of managers);
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (exclusion of
supervisors); Fair Labor Standards Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1982) (exemptions from coverage).
87. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 701-02 (10th ed. 1986); see 2 Collective
Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 40:1 (1986) (grounds for discharge found in 94% of contracts
analyzed); id. § 51:1 (grievance and arbitration procedures found in 97-100% of contracts sampled).
88. Union Membership, supra note 13 at D-1, D-12 (reproducing table based on L. TROY & N.
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sive, including agricultural employees, supervisors, managers, and some
confidential employees. 89 Many of these exclusions are echoed in state labor
laws. Consequently, collective bargaining is largely ineffective for most of the
work force in protecting job security by attempting to balance the negotiating
power of employees and employers.
The second approach, direct government regulation of terms of employ-
ment, has had a dual effect of providing limited job security to some people but
not to others. Although civil rights legislation is phrased in neutral terms
prohibiting categorical discrimination and theoretically provides equal protec-
tion for all citizens, in practice the protection is most significant for members of
minority groups, whether racial, sexual, religious, ethnic, or otherwise. Thus,
while the laws against race and color discrimination theoretically protect white
persons as well as black, yellow, or red,90 they have been used primarily to assist
racial and ethnic minorities and women in combatting discrimination, and only
sparingly in cases of "reverse discrimination" against white males.91 Addition-
ally, some of the protective legislation is narrowly focused on tightly defined
categories, excluding many workers. The age discrimination protections of fed-
eral and state law, for example, provide protection only for employees who come
within certain defined age ranges.
92
For employees who are protected, either because they fit within one of the
protected classifications or are engaged in some sort of protected activity, the at
will presumption is partially set aside in a. contest over whether the employment
termination was motivated by a prohibited reason. The employee alleging an
unlawful discharge must establish a prima facie case by showing facts that di-
rectly demonstrate or lend themselves to a reasonable inference that the dis-
charge was unlawfully motivated.93 If the employee successfully establishes a
SHELIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK 3-18 (1985), showing high point of union penetration in 1953 of
30.4% of nonagricultural employment and 25.9% of total civilian labor force).
89. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) (con-
fidential exclusion); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (managerial exclusion); 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2)-(3) (statutory exclusions).
90. E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Although the McDon-
ald court held that Title VII protects white employees from racial discrimination "upon the same
standards" applicable to black employees, id. at 280, the judicial formulation of the prima facie case
that whites must establish imposes on them a higher burden than on blacks or other "protected
minorities." See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
91. This assertion is exemplified by the recent unsuccessful attempts of the Justice Department
to roll back affirmative action plans favoring minorities and women on the theory that such plans
offend equal protection or unlawfully discriminate against white males in violation of Title VII. See,
e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding race-
conscious affirmative action programs to remedy past discriminatory employment policies); Local
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (same).
92. These vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The federal law protects those above the age
of 40, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982), amended by Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342,
while New York state law protects all those over the age of 18, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3-a) (Mc-
Kinney 1982 & Supp. 1988).
93. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). The elements
of a Title VII plaintiff's prima facie case, as set forth in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), are:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
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prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the discharge. Merely asserting that the alleged unlawful motivation
was not present is not an adequate rebuttal.94 However, the ultimate burden of
proving unlawful discharge rests with the employee, who must provide evidence
that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual. 95 By contrast, under collec-
tively negotiated just cause provisions in labor contracts, arbitrators normally
place the burden of proving a work-related justification for employee termina-
tion on the employer.
96
Given the demands of these justification requirements under laws or collec-
tive agreements, prudent employers, regardless whether their employees have
union representation, would maintain records of employee conduct and per-
formance. If termination becomes necessary and charges are filed, the employer
then would be able to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
discharge, such as inadequate performance or disciplinary problems, and to
counter an allegation that such reason is pretextual. Because inconsistent treat-
ment of employees tends to substantiate allegations of discrimination or lack of
just cause, prudent employers would maintain detailed personnel records on all
employees, not just those possibly covered by protective labor legislation, en-
abling the employer to rebut charges of discrimination and contradict evidence
on the issue of pretext. 97 Thus, employers aware of their potential liability for
unlawful discharge under civil rights laws, labor relations laws, and other regu-
latory statutes would maintain the same kind of personnel records that would be
necessary if the underlying legal framework for employment always required
legitimate justifications for an employer's termination of such a relationship,
such as presently exist in most unionized workplaces.
Viewed together, the just cause standard governing the unionized sector
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. This framework must, of course, be modified to accommodate different employment
discrimination contexts. Id. at 802 n.13. Establishing the prima facie case "'raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, ifotherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors.'" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (quoting Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added)). For white employees to estab-
lish the prima facie case and thereby benefit from this presumption, they must establish that "back-
ground circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority." Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Parker).
Existence of such "background circumstances" is the "functional equivalent of... membership in a
racial minority," and if established along with the other elements of the prima facie case, permits the
inference that unlawful racial motivation was present. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1018.
94. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
95. Id.
96. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 661-63 (4th ed. 1985); see gener-
ally id. at 664-73 (arbitrator's review and modification of penalties imposed by management after
wrongdoing established).
97. For example, if an employee claims she was discharged for refusing sexual advances by a
supervisor, and the employer claims that she was discharged for excessive absenteeism from the job,
it would seem vital to the employer's case that the company have accurate records of employee
attendance and discipline. Such records would show that other employees with similar attendance




and the required articulation of nondiscriminatory reasons for discharges of em-
ployees who are in "protected classes" or are engaging in "protected activities"
create a major disparity in workers' rights. Under the at will presumption, em-
ployees who lack union representation, do not belong to protected minority
groups, or do not engage in protected activities have no enforceable right to
continued employment-regardless of the quality of their work and the contin-
ued existence of their jobs-while the employee at the next work station may
have such a right by virtue of minority group membership, and the employee of
a neighboring company will have the protection due to union representation.
Supervisors, even at a relatively low level of authority, may have far less job
security than the ranks from which they were promoted. 98 Furthermore, public
sector employees, whose salaries and benefits are paid from taxes extracted from
the unprotected private sector employees, may have enforceable employment
rights due to federal or state civil service regulations and constitutional protec-
tions against arbitrary decision making by their governmental employers. 99
The changing regulatory environment and the disparity in worker rights
together may account in part for the significant common-law developments of
the past few years that have nibbled away at the traditional at will rule. Employ-
ees living in such an environment will have expectations about their rights to
continued employment which would not have been held by workers of an earlier
age.10° These modem employees consequently are more likely to react aggres-
sively, rather than acceptingly, to employment terminations which they believe
unjustified.
B. The Common-Law Exceptions of Recent Years
Over the past two decades judicial development of common-law exceptions
to the presumption of at will employment has been extraordinary, attesting to
98. E.g., Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(supervisor discharged for protesting firing of union activist not protected by National Labor Rela-
tions Act).
99. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (comprehensive statutory protections for federal employees); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (due process clause protects state employees' reason-
able expectations of continued employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (same);
see also Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1611 (1984) ("The civil
service system is an explicit acknowledgment that public servants should receive treatment different
from that afforded their counterparts in the private sector."); Note, Reforming At- Will Employment
Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 393 & nn. 19-21 (1983) ("Public sector employees
received protection, first under civil service laws, and later under constitutional due process protec-
tions and federal and state public employee bargaining laws."); Comment, Substantive Due Process:
The Extent of Public Employees' Protection From Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1647,
1648 (1974) ("on the basis of recent Supreme Court and court of appeals precedent, a strong argu-
ment can be made for the existence under the due process clause of protection from arbitrary govern-
ment dismissal"). Because of the special protections they have, public sector employees generally
fall outside the main concerns of this Article.
100. Indeed, some of these expectations are quite recent. In Studs Terkel's Working (1974), a
collection of interviews with employees in a wide range of occupations which took place in the
period before passage of OSHA and ERISA, many interviewees expressed low expectations about
their job rights with respect to issues of safety and pension entitlements. It is likely that now, more
than a decade after passage of those laws, employees would state significantly greater expectations as
to such rights.
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judicial uneasiness with a common-law rule incongruent with contemporary so-
cial expectations and economic realities. Even courts which apply the rule ex-
press some discomfort as they assert that they are bound to follow the rule in the
absence of legislative reform. 10'
The developing exceptions are based on a variety of perceptions about the
inadequacy of the at will presumption. Implied contract exceptions show the
courts' uneasiness with the notion that express representations of job security
must be linked to an agreed duration of employment in order to be enforceable,
or that employment agreements are so inherently different from other types of
agreements that they should not import the same duty of good faith and fair
dealing imposed by custom or statute in other commercial relationships.
Although the law of contracts expounded by some late nineteenth and early
twentieth century scholars embraced a presumption against enforcement in the
absence of mutuality of obligation, consideration, or certainty as to essential
terms, the evolution of contract doctrine, particularly equitable or promissory
estoppel, has led to a climate in which assertions that induce performance are
enforceable at least to the extent of providing some form of compensation to the
injured party when the other party has failed to live up to his promises. 1
0 2
Tort exceptions reflect a concern that unbridled operation of an at will pre-
sumption may undermine important public policies, found expressly or by impli-
cation in statutes or common law, or that it may encourage behavior
inconsistent with current community standards of civility and respect for human
dignity. Just as contract doctrine has evolved away from a presumption against
enforceability of mere representations in a commercial context, the law of torts
has expanded from a mechanism for shifting losses directly caused by intentional
or negligent conduct to a more generalized mechanism for spreading losses due
to conduct which may fairly be said to have led to the losses, in some cases
without requiring a more direct link of causation or fault.
10 3
Although legislation has at times pushed the laws of contracts and torts
toward these results, some of the doctrinal evolution occurred first at the insis-
tence of the courts. The First Restatement of Contracts, for example, noticed
and at least tentatively embraced a judicial trend toward protecting reliance in-
terest through an estoppel theory at a time when legislation thus extending con-
tractual obligation did not exist. 1 4 Similarly, judges led the assault on the
"citadel of privity" to expand tort liability for the results of negligent manufac-
101. See Meredith v. C. E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761, 762 (Ala. 1982) ("The rule has been
applied to obtain harsh and inequitable results."); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d
874, 876 (Miss. 1981) (plaintiff's argument for a cause of action for retaliatory discharge has "con-
siderable appeal," but must be addressed to legislature); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C.
App. 293, 297, 244 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1978) (creation of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge is
left to the general assembly).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) (sup-
plementary general principles of law, including estoppel, applicable).
103. See P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 85, at 614-15 (5th ed.
1984) (noting the struggle between fault-based and strict liability theories to become the dominant
compensation scheme for torts).
104. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 (1932); see G. GILMORE, supra note 37, at
60-65 (account of adoption of promissory estoppel theory by drafters of Restatement of Contracts).
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ture in advance of modem consumer legislation. 10 5 Recently developed com-
mon-law exceptions to the at will presumption show the same judicial desire to
reflect a reality not yet embraced by legislation: the parties in employment rela-
tionships on the whole expect a certain standard of conduct above the traditional
at will presumption, and these expectations deserve judicial recognition when
employer behavior fails to meet them. 10 6 The leading cases on exceptions show
this vividly.
1. The Implied Contract Exceptions: Enforcing Assurances of Job Security
Whether they are contained in informal statements by management, policy
directives, or company handbooks, it is increasingly common and almost neces-
sary to avoid problems under civil rights statutes, whether as a matter of good
personnel relations practice or as a strategy to prevent unionization, 10 7 for em-
ployers to adopt standards and procedures for employment termination deci-
sions that are contrary to a presumption of termination at will. The case reports
reflect this trend, describing company policy statements and handbooks intro-
duced in evidence which contain procedures for dealing with disciplinary
problems. Such handbooks also embrace concepts familiar from the unionized
sector such as progressive discipline, rehabilitation through probation, systems
for review of employee performance, and appeals procedures for disciplinary
decisions by line supervision.10 8 While these policy statements may not always
speak expressly of a just cause or similar standard for discharge, they suggest
that decisions to terminate employment will be made on the basis of uncorrected
poor work performance or for other reasons related to the employer's economic
interests, such as off-duty conduct which directly impairs public confidence in
the employer's product or service. 109
Applying an at will presumption to sustain a discharge in cases when such
company policies exist but have not been followed leads tojudicial decisions that
individuals not indoctrinated in the underlying legal history could only see as
bizarre. These pronouncements may take the form of finding, despite the affirm-
105. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); see also
P. KEETON, supra note 103, § 96, at 681. The "citadel of privity" refers to the doctrine holding
manufacturers harmless when ultimate consumers were injured using their products due to lack of a
primary contractual relation between the parties.
106. The heavy volume of employment at will litigation in recent years shows that terminated
employees believe they have legal job security rights. A 1985 report by an American Bar Associa-
tion committee counted 314 state and federal court employment-at-will decisions announced in
1985, a 37.1% increase over the number of such decisions announced in 1984. See Section on Labor
and Employment Law, American Bar Association, Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the
Workplace, 2 LAB. LAW. 351, 351 (1986). These were primarily appellate decisions, and it is fair to
speculate that they represent only a small percentage of the number of such cases actually filed.
107. See Barbash, The New Industrial Relations, 37 LAB. L.J. 528 (1986).
108. A good example is provided by the company handbook provisions on termination issued by
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. during the 1960s and introduced in evidence in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 310-13, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271-73, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515
(1985).
109. In this regard, personnel manuals may constitute a unilateral adoption by management of
much of the paraphernalia of employee discipline systems under collective bargaining agreements,
the "industrial due process" beloved by labor arbitrators.
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ative statements in the employee handbook, no evidence that the company in-
tended to be legally bound by such statements or to induce employees to rely on
them'1 0 or that the statements were merely offered as a unilateral expression of
good will or good intentions, revocable at any time and thus not such as to
induce reliance by employees.I I Cases mention revocability as a reason for not
enforcing the handbook representations even though the employer has not an-
nounced any general revocation of the handbook or policies contained in it, but
allegedly has not followed those policies in discharging the plaintiff."12
Courts that have found an exception in such circumstances occasionally
have limited the exception in ways reflecting the continuing influence of older
doctrines. In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. t1 3 the New York Court of Appeals
held express job security promises in the handbook enforceable only because
they existed at the time of hiring and were expressly referred to by McGraw-Hill
recruiters when they lured Weiner from a well-paying position with a competi-
tor, in response to an inquiry by Weiner about job security he could expect at
McGraw-Hill.' 1 4 The court also placed weight on evidence that McGraw-Hill
had applied the handbook policies in other cases, and had instructed Weiner to
do so when he made termination decisions about other employees, and that Wei-
ner had turned down subsequent job offers from other employers. IS The only
departure of the McGraw-Hill court from the traditional at will presumption
was the court's willingness to find a legal obligation by the company to follow its
policy in the absence of an agreement of specific duration. The case fits neatly
into a promissory estoppel type of analysis. Weiner had given up his accumu-
lated seniority and an offered pay increase from his previous employer in ex-
110. See Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (applying Flor-
ida law); Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 500
(3d Cir. 1979); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
amended, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Uriarte v. Perez-Molina, 434 F. Supp. 76, 79-80
(D.D.C. 1977); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982); Shaw v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.,
220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (1976); Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn.
424, 428, 110 N.W.2d 863, 866 (1961); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 313-14, 299
N.W.2d 147, 150-51 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410
N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
111. See, eg., Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.S.C.
1985) (manual could be changed unilaterally by employer); Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial
Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 109, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983) (handbook unilaterally revised twice
during employee's employment); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) (employer in no way prevented from unilaterally amending or even totally withdrawing
its handbook); Larose v. Agway, Inc., 147 Vt. 1, 3, 508 A.2d 1364, 1366 (1986) (parties stipulated
that manual adopted, enforced, implemented, and amended by employer unilaterally; thus, summary
judgment for employer is appropriate); see also Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (11 th Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (applying Florida law) ("'grievance procedures contained in the employment
manual could be exercised at the discretion of the defendant,' "; quoting district court). In Joachim
v. AT&T Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), the court applied Texas law
to hold that a corporate policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not
legally binding, noting the comment in Reynolds Mfg. Co. that employee handbooks "'constituted
no more than general guidelines.'" Id. at 114 (quoting Reynolds Mfg. Co., 644 S.W.2d at 539).
112. See cases listed supra note 111.
113. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
114. Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
115. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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change for express promises of job security, had assertedly relied on the
promises in refusing subsequent job offers, and had been instructed by higher
company officials that the company believed the policy to be binding. Subse-
quent New York decisions involving company handbooks show that the excep-
tion in Weiner was narrow in scope and starkly fact-specific.
116
While other courts recognizing a handbook exception have not necessarily
been as restrictive as the New York court in Weiner, these courts still evince the
lingering role of older contract doctrines. Courts state, for example, that the
handbook had to have been in effect at the time of hiring and thus could be
considered part of the "bargain" when the employment agreement was made.1
17
They also require some colorable allegation of a job security promise of which
the employee was aware and on which she had actually relied.1 18
Only a few courts have gone so far as to hold express or strongly implied
job security promises contained in a handbook, regardless when made, binding
on the company if in effect at the time of the discharge, without requiring any
proof of actual prior reliance on the policy by the employee-plaintiff. Perhaps
most prominent among them is the New Jersey Supreme Court in Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. 119 The court held that in the absence of express lan-
guage of disclaimer in the handbook, its provisions on discipline and termination
116. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333-34, 506 N.E.2d 919, 921-22, 514
N.Y.S.2d 209, 211-12 (1987); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 448
N.E.2d 86, 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237-38 (1983); see also Oakley v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 116
A.D.2d 911, 912-13, 498 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1986) (policy statement in handbook-"[t]o provide,
insofar as possible, continuous employment to all whose work proves satisfactory"-not an express
limitation on power of termination; plaintiff failed to show reliance); O'Connor v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 108 A.D.2d 843, 843, 485 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (manual did not limit dismissals for just and
sufficient cause only), aff'd mem., 65 N.Y.2d 724, 481 N.E.2d 549, 492 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1985); Rizzo v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 237, 109 A.D.2d 639, 641, 486 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (1985)
(listing the operative facts of Weiner that "deserve emphasis"); Wexler v. Newsweek, Inc., 109
A.D.2d 714, 715, 487 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331-32 (1985) (mem.) (Weiner is a "rather unique case"; man-
ual unenforceable); Hager v. Union Carbide Corp., 106 A.D.2d 348, 349, 483 N.Y.S.2d 261, 261-62
(1984) (mem.) (no handbook or express promise of job security as found in Weiner exists here);
Gould v. Community Health Plan of Suffolk, Inc., 99 A.D.2d 479, 480, 470 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417
(1984) (mem.) (employee's allegations that he gave up optometry practice to accept position, and
that employer assured him he could have the job as long as he wanted it, and that he would receive
security from personnel policies held insufficient to withstand summary judgment motion); Pa-
trowich v. Chemical Bank, 98 A.D.2d 318, 323, 470 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603 (manual did not contain
express limitation relating to job tenure and no reliance shown, therefore, case not within Weiner
exception), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 473 N.E.2d 11, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659
(1984).
117. E.g., Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam; applying
Florida law); Heidek v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982); Johnson v.
Natural Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins.
Co., 196 Mont. 178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314,
299 N.W.2d 147, 150-51 (1980).
118. Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (handbook provid-
ing for termination procedures, "when relied upon by an employee and supported by the considera-
tion of continued service," may be enforced); Rizzo v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 237,
109 A.D.2d 639, 641-42, 486 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (1985) (no reliance shown, therefore no need to
determine through discovery procedures whether manual existed); Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 98
A.D. 2d 318, 323, 470 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603 (1984) (employee's conclusory statements about reliance
cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment); Speciale v. Tektronix, Inc., 38 Or. App. 441, 444,
590 P.2d 734, 736 (1979) (employee entitled to compliance with only those policies which an em-
ployer has made known to or promised to him).
119. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
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of employment would be treated as contractually binding. 120 Woolley first saw
the handbook several weeks after being hired in 1969, and was discharged in
1978, allegedly because his supervisor had "lost confidence" in him.12 1 The
handbook set out a specific procedure leading to termination which had not been
followed in Woolley's case.' 22 The New Jersey court held that the handbook
constituted an offer for a unilateral contract between the company and its em-
ployees as a group, thereby distinguishing older cases holding that enforcement
of an individual lifetime employment contract would be contrary to public pol-
icy.' 23 The court also held that the handbook should be construed in line with
the reasonable expectations of the employees.
124
Some courts have found that a handbook, while not itself a contract, could
serve as the foundation for implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship to the extent of requiring reasonable adherence to its
provisions governing discipline and discharge.' 25 The handbook exception pro-
vides a limited remedy. Because courts see the contract at issue as one for per-
sonal services, they have awarded only money damages, normally calculated by
resort to traditional contract formulations for measuring an expectation or reli-
ance interest.' 26 Equitable relief, such as reinstatement, is not provided, and,
120. Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269-70.
121. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
122. Id. at 307-08, 491 A.2d at 1270.
123. Id. at 292-301, 491 A.2d at 1262-66. The principal case on which the lower courts in
Woolley had relied was Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952). In Savarese the
employee furnished consideration in addition to services contemplated by the employment relation-
ship by agreeing to play for and manage the company baseball team. In return he received an oral
promise of lifetime employment. Id. at 587-98, 89 A.2d at 238. Noting that courts are reluctant to
enforce such contracts because of their "unusual nature" and lack of mutuality of obligation, the
court required "precision and clarity" as to all the terms and held the contract unenforceable be-
cause of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Id. at 603, 89 A.2d at 240-41. Other cases distinguished in
Woolley included: Schlenk v. Lehigh Valley R.R., I N.J. 131, 62 A.2d 380 (1948); Hindle v. Morri-
son Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 223 A.2d 193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966); Piechowski v.
Matarese, 54 N.J. Super. 333, 148 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Bird v. J.L. Prescott,
89 N.J.L. 591, 99 A. 380 (N.J. 1916); Shaw v. Woodbury Glass Works, 52 N.J.L. 7, 18 A. 696 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1889), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J.L. 666, 24 A. 1004 (N.J. 1891). Except for Schlenk, these
cases also involved contracts held unenforceable because of indefiniteness. See Woolley, 99 N.J. at
293-94, 491 A.2d at 1262.
The Woolley court pointed out the difference in protections afforded to the employee covered by
a general good cause provision and one who has secured a lifetime contract. An employee under a
lifetime contract is protected against any termination. An employee under a good cause provision is
still subject to termination due to, among other causes, vagaries of the business cycle; he is protected
only against arbitrary termination. Id. at 301 n.8, 491 A.2d at 1266 n.8.
124. Id. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264.
125. See infra notes 185-228 and accompanying text (caselaw developed by Montana Supreme
Court). The notion of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will be explored at greater
length in the next section.
126. The usual measure of damages is the difference in the wages the employee would have
received had he not been wrongfully terminated and wages earned by way of mitigation, See Wool-
ley, 99 N.J. at 308, 491 A.2d at 1270; Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 157-
58, 377 A.2d 807, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), modified, 164 N.J. Super. 465, 397 A.2d 334
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); see also Gulf Consol. Int'l, Inc. v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565, 566
(Tex. 1983) (present cash value of contract if it had not been breached, less any amounts employee
should, using reasonable diligence, be able to earn through other employment). If the discharged
employee promptly finds employment at the same or higher wages, computing damages would not
present any problem. Computing damages is problematic if the employee cannot find employment
for an unusually extended period of time or is forced to accept a position for lower wages, assuming
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with some exceptions which may illustrate blurring of doctrinal categories, puni-
tive damages are eschewed as well.127 Thus, the contractual exception based on
express representations of job security does not lead to the specter of a "forced
marriage" 128 between mutually antagonistic parties, but rather requires an em-
ployer to follow its own rules as announced in its handbook or to compensate
the employee for not doing so through a relatively conservative damage
measure.
The handbook exception is only available in the fortuitous circumstance
that an employer has issued such a document. As such, the protection it pro-
vides for employees is fragile, because an employer alerted to the possible unilat-
eral assumption of liability for wrongful terminations may well revoke the
handbook or at least rewrite it to deny expressly any intention to confer contrac-
tual rights on employees. 129 , Oral promises of job security provide an even shak-
ier foundation, because proof may be difficult and the statute of frauds for
contract actions may render the promise unenforceable.
130
2. The Implied Contract Exceptions: Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Sorie courts have become reluctant to exempt employment relationships
from the same obligation of good faith and fair dealing routinely implied in
other economic or commercial relationships founded on some sort of agreement
or understanding. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 131 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court noted how common-law courts had used the concept of implied-
in both cases the employee has used reasonably diligent efforts. Because the duration of the employ-
ment contract is indefinite and may be terminated without liability for a number of reasons, the
courts are unlikely to hold the employer liable for lost wages over the remainder of the discharged
employee's productive life. Instead, they are likely to impose a reasonable time limit on damages.
See Rogozinski, 152 N.J. Super. at 144, 377 A.2d at 813 (limiting damages for breach of a "perpet-
ual" employment contract to wages lost over a two-year period). For a general discussion on the
issue of damages in wrongful discharge cases, see Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful
Discharge of At-Will Employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 1131 (1986).
127. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983), is a prime example of
blurring of categories, discussed in more detail infra notes 189-228 and accompanying text. For a
rare example of a case awarding other than traditional contract damages for breach of a provision in
an implied handbook contract, see Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067, 1080-84 (W.D.
Mich. 1982) (negligent performance of contractual duty to perform job evaluations is actionable;
discharged employee receives damages for mental distress),
128. See Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881, 889-90
(1983) (analogizing employment to a marriage relationship).
129. See, e.g., Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (N.D. 1986) (dis-
claimer in handbook relieves employer of duty to abide by progressive discipline policy announced
therein).
130. The recent New York decision Harrison v. Susskind, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1986, at 13, col. 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1986) (N.Y. County, Justice Baer), provides a striking illustration of these
problems. Ms. Harrison alleged she was orally promised a position by television personality David
Susskind during an encounter in a restaurant, in reliance on which she quit her job and reported for
work at the Susskind organization. At that time, she alleged that she was told she would have to lose
some weight and would not be happy working there. She sued for a breach of employment contract.
The court dimissed the contract claim but gave leave to amend the complaint to allege employment
discrimination because New York recognizes obesity as a disability under its fair employment prac-
tices law. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 480 N.E.2d 695,
698, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 109 (1985).
131. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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in-law covenants to soften the pro-landlord bias of old property law.132 The
court further recognized the evolution of employment law "over the years to
reflect changing legal, social and economic conditions," characterized by the
court as "the new climate prevailing generally in the relationship of employer
and employee." 133 The court adopted a balancing test to determine whether a
particular termination was consistent with evolving common-law doctrine:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be bal-
anced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employ-
ment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance
between the two. We hold that a termination by the employer of a
contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or mal-
ice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract. Such a rule affords the employee a certain stability of em-
ployment and does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of
his right to discharge, which is necessary to permit him to operate his
business efficiently and profitably.
134
Mrs. Monge claimed she had been terminated for refusing sexual advances from
her supervisor. 135 When the case arose courts generally did not recognize sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII,136 and the New Hampshire court was
venturing into new territory by recognizing a public interest in providing redress
for such conduct. 137 Unlike other courts that based exceptions to the at will
presumption on notions of public policy, 138 the New Hampshire court treated
the matter as entirely one of contract, disallowing "pain and suffering" damages
awarded by the jury as "not generally recoverable in a contract action." 139
Sometimes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been narrowly
construed or closely tied to performance of obligations already executed within
the relationship. In the Massachusetts case Fortune v. The National Cash Regis-
ter Co., 140 Fortune, a salesman paid partly by salary and partly by bonuses, was
132. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
133. Id. at 132-33, 316 A.2d at 551.
134. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 130, 316 A.2d at 550.
136. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The Supreme Court has only recently ruled that sexual harassment is actionable as unlawful sex
discrimination, more than fifteen years after Mange was decided. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986).
137. It is also interesting to note that Mrs. Monge was represented by a union and presumably
could have pursued a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. Curiously, the court does
not discuss that possibility and treats the case as one involving an at will employment relationship.
Perhaps the union contract did not provide a just cause standard for discharge.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 160-84.
139. The New Hampshire Supreme Court drew back from the broad language of Monge in How-
ard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980), in which the general covenant lan-
guage was limited to a more narrow public policy exception. The Howard court construed Monge to
"apply only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public
policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Id. at 297, 414
A.2d at 1274. Under this construction, a complaint alleging that the plaintiff-employee was dis-
charged because of his age or sickness was insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id.
140. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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discharged after participating in a sale which would entitle him to significant
bonuses under his written contract.141 Fortune alleged "bad faith" in the termi-
nation of his employment, and a jury agreed. 142 The Supreme Judicial Court
upheld the jury verdict on a theory that a discharge which would deprive an
employee of compensation to which he was entitled by virtue of past perform-
ance must be tested, by the good faith of the employer.
14 3 Noting Monge,144
which had fully incorporated such a good faith duty into an employment rela-
tion, the Massachusetts court shied away from such a broad incorporation,
adopting instead the more limited formulation summarized above. As such, the
"Massachusetts Rule" creates a very limited exception.
1 45
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing, without more, may present a
basis for protecting job security, but due to its amorphous character may require
additional evidence of employer and employee expectations, perhaps in the form
of published disciplinary procedures, to acquire sufficient structure for enforce-
ability. For example, in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,14 6 an employee with
eighteen years' seniority who was dismissed for alleged theft asserted he had
been denied due process guaranteed in the company's published handbook. 147
The employee brought suit on a contract theory arguing both enforceability of
the handbook terms and a more general duty of good faith and fair dealing.
148
A California appellate court held longevity of service, by itself, provided a basis
for finding a violation of "the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts;' 49 and that
the promulgation of a handbook policy is evidence that the employer himself
recognized such an obligation.
150
The good faith and fair dealing exception imports a large measure of subjec-
tivity, introducing employer motivation as an issue and censuring those motiva-
tions which either a jury or a court consider improper. Consequently, the
remedies issue becomes more complicated than in the handbook cases. The New
Hampshire court in Monge, for example, rejected damages for pain and suffering
141. Id. at 97-100, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
142. Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
143. Id. at 102-03, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57.
144. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (holding discharge for refusing to date fore-
man violative of duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract).
145. Melley v. Gillette Corp., 397 Mass. 1004, 1006, 491 N.E.2d 252, 253 (1986), aff'g 19 Mass.
App. Ct. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985) (rejecting creation of a wrongful discharge action based on
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) confirms the narrow scope of Fortune. However, the
Massachusetts court recently left open the possibility of a tort remedy for the method of termination.
Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985) (dismissing wrongful discharge action but
giving leave to amend complaint to assert tort actions).
146. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Pptr. 722 (1980).
147. Id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
148. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
149. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
150. Id. Montana Supreme Court decisions illustrate this same phenomenon of building a good
faith requirement, and, indeed, stretching it into a quasi-tort, out of promulgation of a handbook not
itself directly enforceable. E.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063
(1982), appeal from decision on remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983). Subsequent cases in
that court are discussed at greater length infra notes 185-252 and accompanying text.
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after holding the evidence could support a jury finding that the termination was
"maliciously motivated," and that Monge's cause of action rested on some un-
derstanding of "the public good."' 51 The court in Gates v. Life of Montana
Insurance Co.,152 after initially holding a termination violated an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing,' 53 subsequently authorized the award of
punitive damages on the theory that "if defendant's conduct is sufficiently culpa-
ble" a breach of the covenant would be a tort.' 5 4 Despite differences over how
damages are to be measured in such a case, none of the courts have ordered
reinstatement. Courts have not applied the exception to impose an unwanted
employee on the employer, but have merely required that termination decisions
be made in a way that could be characterized as fair, and have assessed a finan-
cial penalty against an employer who does not live up to such a standard.
Judicial reluctance in some states to engraft a broad covenant of good faith
and fair dealing onto the employment relationship may derive from the poor fit
of employment agreements with commercial contract doctrines. Employment
agreements are intrinsically different from commercial contracts in many funda-
mental ways. Employment agreements create an ongoing personal relationship
between employee and employer-or, in larger companies, with the employer's
managerial and supervisory agents-which transcends purely economic inter-
ests. Courts have recognized this relationship by identifying various rights and
obligations of employers and employees not typically mentioned in connection
with commercial contracts, including duties of loyalty 55 and intrinsic rights of
management, direction, and control.' 5 6 While applying some objective standard
of good faith and fair dealing based on the usual practices of merchants seems
appropriate for commercial contracts involving sales of goods or even sales of
services by independent contractors,' 57 identifying the components of such a
standard in the more personalized employment relationship poses difficulties.
Not least among these is the difficulty of putting into words standards general
enough to apply broadly to the wide range of employment relationships, but
detailed enough to have a meaning more specific than "be nice." Workplaces
151. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
152. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982), appealfrom decision on remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668
P.2d 213 (1983).
153. Id. at 184-85, 638 P.2d at 1067.
154. Gates, 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 215.
155. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (com-
mon-law duty of loyalty owed by employees to employers not abrogated by NLRA; employees who
distributed handbills disparaging employer's broadcasts without referring to ongoing labor dispute
were not engaged in protected activity under § 7 of NLRA and were rightfully discharged "for
cause").
156. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (decision to close part of
business within sole discretion ofemployer). The commitment of investment capital and the scope of
an employer's business are matters which "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control," Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), and as such may be
decided unilaterally by the employer without prior notification to or bargaining with the union, no
matter how inevitably they affect job security. Courts frequently rely on Justice Stewart's "core of
entrepreneurial control" concept to limit the employer's duty to bargain over subjects which fall
within the literal terms of the statutorily mandated subjects of collective bargaining, "terms and
conditions of employment." See, eg., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 672-73 & nn.8-9.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
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vary widely in their own internally generated common law of procedures, hierar-
chies, folkways, and understandings. Employer or employee behavior which
would be deemed offensive on an assembly line might not merit any comment on
a loading dock, or vice versa. Different managers and supervisors bring different
personal and professional styles to the running of a workplace. An individualis-
tic determination in a particular case as to whether a termination decision was
made in good faith or represented fair dealing could be a difficult task for a court
that does not possess specific knowledge of the workplace and its reflection in
the expectations and understandings of those who work there.158
Perhaps the solution is to characterize and treat the employment agreement
as a species of agreement different from other commercial transactional con-
tracts, and to derive some new standards peculiar to employment that could be
applied by a neutral decisionmaker-whether judge, magistrate, or independent
arbitrator-to resolve disputes about employment termination. At this point,
the notion of treating labor law as a contract problem begins to dissolve into the
broader area of civil liability normally associated with the law of torts, which
may explain some of the confusion of categories found in judicial decisions grap-
pling with the problem.
1 59
3. Public Policy Exceptions
In order to prevent an employer from acting contrary to an important pub-
lic policy, some state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge" as
an exception to the at will presumption.1 60 The underlying rationale is that the
158. A similar contention underlies much of the jurisprudence on enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
Accordingly, courts are required to (1) enforce a party's right to arbitrate a grievance covered by a
collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause, no matter how frivolous the claim might appear
to the court, United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960);
(2) resolve all doubts regarding the applicability of an arbitration clause in favor of coverage, United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); and (3) re-
fuse to review the merits of an arbitration award, as long as it "draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960). The special competence of the arbitrator to settle industrial disputes justifies this
reliance on the arbitration process:
The parties expect that [the arbitrator's] judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not
only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits,
such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For
the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common
goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve their
specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582.
159. This is reminiscent of the "confusion of principles and rules" Feinman observed in examin-
ing the status of the common law of employment termination during the 19th century. See supra
text accompanying notes 51-53. A more detailed consideration of such a generalized civil action will
be deferred until after discussion of judicial development of the tort of wrongful discharge.
160. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980) (discharge for refusal to commit criminal act is tortious); Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusing to commit
perjury before legislative committee is actionable in tort); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
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traditional formulation of the at will rule-that a discharge could be predicated
even on a bad or morally wrong reason-would undermine legislative attempts
to enhance social welfare if too rigidly observed, or would sanction behavior
inimical to general societal interests embraced in the common law.1 61 As with
the statutory exceptions, the public policy exception does not replace the at will
presumption, but instead provides a mechanism for identifying illegitimate rea-
sons for discharge.
A major difficulty in applying a public policy exception arises when courts
seek to identify public policy. Who makes public policy for this purpose, and
where is it to be found? The governmental system created by the federal consti-
tution and echoed in the structures of state governments formally designates
legislative bodies as the makers of public policy, but neat separation of functions
between executive, legislative, and judicial branches has become blurred over
two centuries of practice. From the very beginning, when the common law of
England was taken over as the common law of the newly independent states,
state courts played an important role in identifying public policy wholly apart
from legislative or executive actions. Courts created major new areas of civil
liability in contract, tort, and property law without substantive legislative gui-
dance, implying new warranties, guarantees, and standards of behavior through
the development of private law to meet changing economic and social condi-
tions. 162 Judicially developed principles of public policy may have been founded
at times on particular constitutional or statutory provisions, but the connection
has not always been precise or particularly convincing.
Courts derive the policies underlying such decisions from notions of evolv-
ing standards of conduct appropriate in society. As judges dealt in the area of
private law, their task was to identify the expectations of individuals entering
into relationships, or the common expectations of society as to standards of con-
duct, and to compensate individuals who were injured when those expectations
were not realized or the standards were not met. Such standards or expectations
are not easy to articulate, and it should not be too surprising when a judicial
85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee's complaint that he was discharged for cooperating
with police investigation of fellow employee stated a cause of action in tort); Frampton v. Cent. Ind.
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge for filing workmen's compensation claim
held tortious); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 5-6, 606 P.2d 127, 129-30 (1980) (expressing will-
ingness to recognize tort action for discharges contravening public policy); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for serving on jury is tortious); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162
W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (discharge for seeking to ensure that bank management complied
with consumer credit law actionable).
161. See, eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 173, 610 P.2d 1330, 1333, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1980) ("To hold that one's continued employment could be made contingent
upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage crimi-
nal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and serve to contaminate the honest
administration of public affairs."); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 182, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357
(1979) (The comprehensive remedial scheme of the Worker's Compensation Act "would be seriously
undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by threatening to dis-
charge employees for seeking compensation under the Act.").
162. See generally M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1977) (tracing evolution of American law through judicial development from the received common




decision in an evolving area of private law does not articulate ideally the reason-
ing underlying its result. However, policies identified by common law judges are
never wholly new in the sense of being entirely unprecedented. Rather, they
mark evolutionary changes from older policies which have become either less
relevant, or inappropriate, to new social conditions. 163 Thus, the tradition of
common-law adjudication supports the development of public policy exceptions
that may not have a direct basis in existing constitutional or legislative provi-
sions, and arguably could embrace judicial derivation of a new hybrid cause of
action for unjustifiable termination of employment or some equivalent new civil
action. 164
Executive orders, rules, and regulations can also embody statements of pub-
lic policy. Their limits are that the former must be within the broad constitu-
tional powers of the executive and the latter must not violate the letter or intent
of enabling statutes, which frequently are quite vague as to the details of the
broad policies they establish. 165 Consequently, common-law courts may be jus-
tified in deriving public policy exceptions to the at will presumption based on
executive orders or executive or administrative policies and procedures.
The most traditional sources for finding public policy are the official docu-
ments of policy-federal and state constitutions and legislative enactments.
Some statutes not only enact policies limiting the discretion of employers to ter-
minate their employees, but provide administrative or judicial mechanisms for
their enforcement. An important issue in the developing caselaw on public pol-
icy exceptions is the degree to which such statutes should be held to preempt a
common-law cause of action based on the same policy arguments. 166 The issue
163. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921). Justice Cardozo
wrote,
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral. What is
good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the
foundation on which new structures will be built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in
the laboratory of the years. Little by little the old doctrine is undermined. Often the en-
croachments are so gradual that their significance is at first obscured. Finally we discover
that the contour of the landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be cast aside,
and the ground charted anew.
Id. Justice Cardozo also noted how accumulated exceptions to common-law "rules" could eventu-
ally be extended to create a new underlying rule: "There has been a new generalization which,
applied to new particulars, yields results more in harmony with past particulars, and, what is still
more important, more consistent with the social welfare. This work of modification is gradual. It
goes on inch by inch." Id. at 25; see also G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 3-5 (1982) (describing historic role of common-law courts in prestatutory period); K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66-69 (1930) (how judges use precedent to accomplish both
stability and change).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 296-300.
165. Examples of Executive Orders affecting job security rights include the executive orders of
President Nixon which permitted collective bargaining in the federal sector prior to its statutory
recognition in the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act. Executive Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861-75
(1966-70), amended by Executive Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 605-09 (1971-75). An additional ex-
ample is the executive order regulating the employment practices of federal contractors. Executive
Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-65). Other significant examples are the regulations
adopted by the Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, imposing a
"reasonable accommodation" requirement on employers of otherwise qualified handicapped persons
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1987).
166. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (union employee un-
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may arise in several situations. For example, a terminated employee may fail to
comply with procedural requirements for asserting a statutory claim, usually by
failing to file an administrative complaint within a relatively short statute of
limitations, 167 and later seek to assert a common-law claim based on the statu-
tory policy under a more extended statute of limitations available for torts. An-
other example is a plaintiff who seeks to append a public policy claim as an
alternative ground in a breach of contract action. 168 The preemption issue also
arises when an employee covered by collective bargaining seeks to pursue a com-
mon-law discharge action instead of labor contract remedies. 169 Because reme-
dies available through protective labor statutes or labor arbitration tend to be
limited to reinstatement with or without backpay, 170 discharged employees who
do not wish to return to a hostile workplace may prefer a common-law tort
remedy providing compensatory and punitive damages rather than the less de-
sirable and remunerative statutory relief.
Additional legislative sources for public policy exceptions are statutes that
do not expressly provide a mechanism for individual employees to vindicate the
rights they suggest, but that may nonetheless provide a basis for inferring such
successfully challenged discharge in arbitration proceeding pursuant to collective bargaining agree-
ment and then brought wrongful discharge suit based on state public policy; held, suit not preempted
by § 301 of LMRA); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania's
age discrimination statute precludes common-law wrongful discharge action asserting age discrimi-
nation); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (Massachusetts
comprehensive age discrimination statute does not preclude common-law contract action alleging
discharge motivated by age discrimination); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Brinkman v. State, 729 P.2d 1301 (Mont. 1986) (existence of collective bargaining protection
preempts state law action founded on implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (remedies provided in workers' compensation
statute inadequate; employee entitled to maintain common-law retaliatory discharge action to re-
dress firing after filing for benefits); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) (Title VII remedies do not preclude an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1982)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) ("Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."). For a general discussion of this preemption issue, see Greenbaum, supra note 75
at 80-114.
167. Statutes of limitations under employment statutes tend to be shorter than statutes of limita-
tions for common-law claims. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, § 10, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1982), requires unfair labor practice charges to be filed within six months. Federal and
state civil rights laws generally impose a statute of limitations of a year or less, while contracts and
torts claims generally can be asserted after a year or more. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576 (Supp.
1986) (six years for contract actions); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577 (1960) (three years for tort ac-
tions); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. LAW § 213(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1986) (six years for con-
tract actions); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. LAW § 214(4), (5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1986) (three
years for actions to recover damages for an injury to property or personal injury); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1986) (one year for intentional torts). For a listing
of state statutes of limitations for suits under state fair employment laws ranging from thirty days to
one year, see Greenbaum, supra note 75, at 86 n.138.
168. A variation on this scenario may be found in McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980), in which the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts recognized a wrongful discharge action premised on age discrimination under an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The employee's breach of contract action otherwise would have
been barred by the statute of frauds and an alternative remedy under state age discrimination law
was unavailable.
169. Eg., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 226 (1987); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984); Midgett v.
Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Il. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
170. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
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enforcement rights in a common-law action. Perhaps the most common exam-
ples of this phenomenon are workers' compensation laws, which have
nonretaliation provisions in some jurisdictions but not in others. 17 1 To ensure
that employees are free to apply for benefits to which they are entitled, courts
prohibit employers from interfering by threats, coercion, or dismissal of the
employee. 1
72
Another area of public policy exceptions concerns public functions which
would be obstructed if employers penalize employees for participating in them.
An exception to at will termination may be found when an employer interferes
with the function of the courts by retaliating against employees who testify
truthfully, refuse to testify untruthfully, or serve on juries. 17 3 Another example
is the so-called "whistle-blower" exception, which protects employees from eco-
nomic losses due to termination following a report of employer noncompliance
with regulatory laws.
174
While public policy exceptions are relatively noncontroversial, and even en-
dorsed by some defenders of the at will presumption, 175 some plaintiffs have
attempted to extend this exception to virtually any situation in which an em-
ployee is dismissed for acting in a way which might be seen as public-spirited or
in personal compliance with laws binding on the employer. Thus, in a leading
California case an employee who refused to participate in a price-fixing scheme
was found to have been discharged in violation of antitrust policy. 17 6 This sort
of theory also underlies a Pennsylvania case in which the court disapproved of a
termination to retaliate against an employee who refused to endorse and act on
the employer's political views.
177
171. Compare, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West. Supp. 1986) (anti-retaliation provision); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 111 (1985) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.82 (West. Supp. 1986)
(same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon 1986) (same); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1986) (same) with ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901 to -1091 (1983 & Supp. 1985) (no
anti-retaliation provision included); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -1-69 (Supp. 1986) (same); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1985) (same).
172. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind.
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245
N.W.2d 151 (1976); see also Annotation, Recoveryfor Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for
Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221, 1227-35 (1984) (listing and discussing
cases in which cause of action expressly or impliedly contained in statute or recognized by courts as
common-law cause of action).
173. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335
S.E.2d 13 (1985) (refusal to testify untruthfully or incompletely in civil action against employer);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (jury service); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (jury service); cf Petermann v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusing to commit perjury
before legislative committee).
174. See, eg., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (con-
sumer credit and protection laws); Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower From Retaliatory Discharge,'
16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983). Indeed, some states have actually codified this exception by
enacting specific protection for "whistle-blowers" in some situations. E.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(a)
(McKinney 1986) (prohibiting retaliatory discharges for disclosures of violations of laws, rules, or
regulations that create "a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety").
175. Power, supra note 128, at 881.
176. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
177. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Some courts find this sort of exception insufficiently related to a determina-
ble public policy to overcome the at will presumption.17 8 Courts may recognize
and give weight to employers' expectations that employees should be loyal.
Thus, courts may condone discharges for disloyalty even though the result may
be to discourage employees from vigorously pursuing their employer's compli-
ance with regulatory laws. 179 Some courts have similarly given a narrow con-
struction to the "whistle-blower" concept, restricting its protection to those
employees who have a direct job responsibility for compliance with the particu-
lar law which is cited in support of the exception. 180 Other courts have rejected
attempts to assimilate employment statutes into a common-law cause of action,
holding in effect that the more limited statutory remedies are the exclusive
mechanism for asserting statutory rights.18 1 Several state courts have rejected
attempts to predicate a termination action on public policies contained in anti-
discrimination laws.1
8 2
Courts faced with a public policy argument have searched for an existing
label to place on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently described
it as a tort of wrongful discharge. Application of the tort label has its own
consequences, however, including possible requirements that the plaintiff show
an intention to inflict injury or at least negligent or reckless infliction of injury,
and has opened the door to possibilities of punitive damages. The serious conse-
quences of making particular employer conduct actionable as a tort may explain
the reluctance of some courts to recognize a common law wrongful discharge
action, sometimes under the guise of deferral to the legislature on the creation of
"new torts."' 183
Excepting situations in which a discharge is carried out in an egregiously
178. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (public policy too vague a
concept to justify creation of tort of wrongful discharge); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291
Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (employee's failure to show specific statutory violations fatal to claim);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (employee must identify
a specific declaration of public policy evidenced by a statute or constitutional provision; discharging
an employee because his testimony in a pending sex discrimination claim brought by a fellow em-
ployee might be contrary to the employer's interest does not contravene a clearly defined mandate of
public policy); see also DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(no civil cause of action provided for alleged interference with constitutionally guaranteed access to
courts; discharge for bringing personal injury suit on behalf of daughter not actionable), aff'd, 384
So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio App. 3d 203, 451 N.E.2d
1236 (1982) (no independent cause of action for sex discrimination in statute; at will rule applied).
179. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
180. Id. at 181, 319 A.2d at 178-79 (salesman not expert in safety matters; discharge for oppos-
ing marketing of a product he thought defective not actionable).
181. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (statutory remedy in
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act precludes common-law claim); Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3688 (D. Kan. 1984) (common-law claim for wrongful discharge requires showing
of public policy violation and absence of other statutory remedy); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.
Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984) (remedy in Massachusetts employment discrimination statute precludes
common-law claim).
182. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983); see also Greenbaum, supra note 75 (advocating creation of common law cause of action
for employment discrimination).
183. See, eg., Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36 ("Both of
these aspects of the issue, involving perception and declaration of public policy ... are best and more
appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government.").
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offensive or insensitive manner, 184 or with a proven intention to inflict emotional
injury on the employee, the field of tort seems inappropriate to deal with many
employment terminations. Traditional tort elements appear irrelevant to some
of the issues central to a termination dispute, and the common-law tort compen-
sation scheme may provide an inappropriate measure for damages. Thus, the
equivocal embrace of tort as a basis for the public policy exception is quite un-
derstandable, and it is not surprising that some courts have expressed reluctance
to recognize a tort-based public policy exception without legislative backing.
4. A Case Study of Merged Doctrine: The Termination Decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court
Employee discharge disputes do not always fit easily into the domain of
contract. Although the employment relationship is founded conceptually on an
agreement, many of its terms are not the result of conscious bargaining. The
resulting "contract" does not neatly fit into the exchange transaction model typi-
cal of commercial contract law. 185 Additionally, to the extent the express agree-
ment exists, it rarely includes explicit provisions governing termination, making
difficult a determination of whether a termination constitutes a breach of the
agreement. Likewise, discharge disputes do not always fit well into tort doctrine.
Termination may result in injury, but lack of tortious motivation or behavior in
some cases renders absurd the view that a tort has been committed, even though
the discharge was without any objective justification, or otherwise seems to have
been unfairly carried out.
In a few states the courts have borrowed evolving principles of modem
contract and tort law to fashion a new approach to employee termination ques-
tions. California courts have been leaders in this process, 186 embracing several
different theories, including public policy tort exceptions, contract exceptions,
and implied warranties, which have thrived side by side with prior legislative
codification of an at will presumption. 187 That the California courts have taken
the lead is not surprising, given their past record of innovation in common-law
developments of torts, contract, and property.
188
184. See Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982), appeal after
remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) (employee discharged without prior warning and
forced to sign a letter of resignation which barred her claim to unemployment benefits; promise of
favorable recommendation was later breached).
185. Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New York The Paralysis of Nine-
teenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 959-60 (1985).
186. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(public policy exception; refusal to violate antitrust laws); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.
3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (1981) (implied contract exception; oral promise and longev-
ity of employment); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (public policy exception; refusal to commit
perjury); Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949) (public
policy tort exception; retaliation for participation as election poll official).
187. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
188. The California Supreme Court's pioneering rulings in many common-law areas over the
past several decades are noted in law review commentaries on the jurisprudence of Roger J. Traynor,
a long-time member and chief justice of that court. See Leflar, Roger J. Traynor-Exemplar of the
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The termination decisions of the Montana Supreme Court during the first
half of the 1980s are especially deserving of attention. The Montana justices
derived an approach that, despite an initial lack of conceptual clarity, has pro-
duced an increasingly coherent and logical pattern of doctrine.18 9 Although
Montana has a statutory provision which arguably embodies an at will presump-
tion,190 its highest court found a way to bring the statute in line with contempo-
rary expectations by the manipulation of contract and torts concepts, and
eventually goaded the state legislature into adopting the nation's first, and to
date only, general wrongful discharge statute.191
The Montana Supreme Court first decided a private sector wrongful dis-
charge claim in Keneally v. Orgain,192 in which it observed a "growing tendency
of the judicial system to grant relief to persons who have been abusively or
wrongfully discharged,"' 193 but that violation of an articulated public policy,
presumably contained in a statute, must be shown to sustain such an action.
Although it dismissed the wrongful discharge claim in the case, the unanimous
court stated that "in a proper case a cause for wrongful discharge could be made
out by an employee," without specifying whether the claim would sound in con-
tract or tort. 1
9 4
Having recognized the possibility of a wrongful discharge action, the court
developed the contours of such an action in Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co. 195
and Nye v. Department of Livestock.19 6 In Gates the employee was terminated
from a clerical position without advance warning and was pressured into signing
a letter of resignation, which later barred her claim for unemployment bene-
fits.1 9 7 The company had issued a personnel manual containing procedures
Judicial Process, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 1; Tobriner, Retrospect. Ten Years on the California Supreme
Court, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 5 (1972); Ursin, The California Supreme Court: Tort Lav Pathfinder,
BRIEF, Aug. 1982, at 4, 6; Memorial Tributes to Roger J. Traynor, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1037 (1983);
Symposium on Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1965).
189. See Hopkins & Robinson, Employment At-Will, Wrongful Discharge, and the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Montana, Past, Present, and Future, 46 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1985)
(summary of Montana at-will case law through the end of 1984).
190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1987) provides, as described by a state supreme court jus-
tice, "that employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on
notice to each other." Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 316, 668 P.2d 213, 219 (1983)
(Gulbrandson, J., dissenting). This provision is contained in the portion of the state's Wage and
Hour law dealing with payment obligations when employment terminates.
191. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914
(1987).
192. 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980). An earlier case, Sovey v. Chouteau County Dist. Hosp.,
173 Mont. 392, 567 P.2d 941 (1977), presented the court with an opportunity to consider adopting
an exception to the state's at will rule, but the court refrained from considering the issue. See Hop-
kins & Robinson, supra note 189, at 6.
193. Keneally, 186 Mont. at 5, 606 P.2d at 129.
194. Id. at 6, 606 P.2d at 130. Keneally left Montana law essentially in the same place as the law
in Pennsylvania after Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), a case
cited by the Keneally court. A subsequent case, Reiter v. Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d 845 (Mont.
1981), denied a wrongful discharge claim by a public employee for reasons based on statutes not
relevant to this Article.
195. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982), appeal after remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213
(1983).
196. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982).
197. Gates, 196 Mont. at 180, 638 P.2d at 1064.
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which were not followed in her case. 19 8 Her complaint alleged in the alternative
tort, contract, and other state and federal law theories. 199 Finding no public
policy violation, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss.20°
The Supreme Court held that the personnel manual was not itself an en-
forceable contract, because it had not been issued until two years after Gates was
hired, 20 1 but used the handbook in finding a violation of an implied "good faith"
obligation. Noting that such an obligation inhered in commercial contracts
under the Montana Commercial Code20 2 and had been recognized elsewhere,
2 0 3
the court held that the employer's unilateral publication of "certain procedures
with regard to terminations" created a standard of conduct by which the em-
ployer's good faith should be measured. 2 4 The court did not specify whether
the breach of covenant sounded in contract or tort, or what an appropriate dam-
age measure would be, but implicitly held the action sounded in contract when it
commented that "appellant's claim in tort for wrongful discharge is unsupported
by any showing of a violation of public policy as required under Keneally v.
Orgain."20 5
Decided a few days after Gates, Nye v. Department of Livestock20 6 gave
substantive content to a tort of wrongful discharge. The plaintiff was discharged
for poor performance in a position to which she had been promoted. She was
afforded departmental review, but a hearing board's recommendation that she be
reassigned to a position for which she was qualified was overruled by the depart-
ment head. She sought judicial review, but the trial court dismissed all her
claims.
20 7
Agreeing that Montana law provided no right to judicial review of a depart-
mental personnel decision and extended a privilege to the employer's allegations
of incompetence, the Supreme Court sustained dismissal of those portions of the
198. The personnel manual provided that discipline, with some exceptions not relevant to her
case, would only be applied after a prior warning. The manual was not in effect at the time she was
hired. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1064-65.
199. In addition to breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and tort of wrongful discharge, Gates alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and
deceit in procuring a letter of resignation and failing to return the letter on demand, violation of
ERISA, and violation of several Montana employment statutes, including one assertedly requiring
advance notice prior to discharge. Id. at 181-82, 638 P.2d at 1065.
200. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
201. Id. at 184-85, 638 P.2d at 1067.
202. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-203 (1987). A prior decision had implied such an obligation in
an insurance contract. See First Security Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
203. The court cited the same cases cited by plaintiff in Reiter v. Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d
845 (Mont. 1981).
204. Gates, 196 Mont. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067. The court observed that the employer did not
have to issue the manual, but having done so had created certain expectations in the minds of em-
ployees. "If the employer has failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its employees is
shattered and an injustice is done." Id. Because the appeal reversed a dismissal of the complaint, the
matter was remanded for trial on the question whether the standard set in the manual had been
violated.
205. Id. at 185, 638 P.2d at 1067 (citing Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980)).
206. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982). Gates was decided January 5, 1982, and the Nye
decision was announced January 14.
207. Id. at 223-25, 639 P.2d at 499-500.
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complaint. 20 8 But the court held that Nye's discharge implicated a public pol-
icy,20 9 founded on administrative rules and policies that created a "just cause"
standard for removal of "permanent employees" and required that "due pro-
cess" be followed in such cases.210 Finding that Nye had achieved a "permanent
status" in her prior permit clerk position, the court asserted that her termination
would violate these policies when only her performance in the job to which she
had been promoted had been evaluated. 2 11 The court remanded with instruc-
tions to give the employer an opportunity to reconsider the case before proceed-
ing with trial. 212 Although the case involved public employment, the court did
not expressly rely on constitutional protections.
Nye gives a broad sweep to the public policy tort of wrongful discharge,
especially considering that the plaintiff had been found by a hearing board to be
unqualified for the job from which she was terminated, and that the public pol-
icy identified by the court was based on administrative regulations rather than a
statute. As precedent for private sector cases Nye may stand for the proposition
that sources of public policy other than statutes may be the basis for a wrongful
discharge action in tort.
In Gates on remand, a jury awarded $1,891 in compensatory damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages. 2 13 The case came back to the Supreme Court when
Gates appealed the trial judge's decision to set aside the award of punitive dam-
ages. The court held that violations of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
sounded in tort because the duty "is imposed by operation of law,"' 214 and that
punitive damages should be available.215 A dissenter, noting that the earlier
opinion had dismissed the tort claim and sustained a contract action based on
breach of an implied covenant, argued that tort actions should be restricted to
those based on public policy.
216
208. Id. at 225-26, 639 P.2d at 500-01.
209. Id. at 229, 639 P.2d at 501.
210. Id. at 229, 639 P.2d at 502. The court placed specific reliance on Montana Department of
Administration Policies 3-0130 (discipline handling) and 3-0125 (grievances).
211. Nye, 196 Mont. at 229, 639 P.2d at 502-03.
212. Id. at 230, 639 P.2d at 503.
213. Gates, 205 Mont. at 305, 668 P.2d at 214.
214. Id. at 307, 668 P.2d at 214-15. The court's full statement of its reasoning is interesting:
An action for breach of an implied covenant of fair dealing, at first blush, may sound both
in contract and tort. The duty arises out of the employment relationship, yet the duty
exists apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties. In this respect,
the duty is much like the duty to act in good faith in discharging insurance contractual
obligations .... The duty is imposed by operation of law and therefore its breach should
find a remedy in tort.
Id. (citation omitted).
215. The court thus found that a Montana statute which appears to forbid punitive damages in
contract actions was not applicable. Id. (construing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983)). The
same statute sets the standard for awarding punitive damages "where the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed." Id.
216. Gates, 205 Mont. at 320-21, 668 P.2d at 221-22 (Weber, J., dissenting). In a lengthier,
angrier dissent, Justice Gulbrandson, who had not participated in the first Gates decision, made
many of the same arguments, and observed: "In my view, the majority, by extending the original
Gates decision, has set the stage for a 'just cause standard for at-will employees,' which I believe is a
legislative rather than a judicial function." Id. at 316, 668 P.2d at 219 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting).
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Gates 11 left Montana with a double-barrelled tort exception to the at will
rule: (1) a tort of wrongful discharge based on violation of public policy, and
(2) a tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
later cases, the Montana Supreme Court consolidated and refined this two-
pronged tort approach. The court ruled in Dare v. Montana Petroleum Market-
ing 2 17 that neither a statute nor a regulation was a necessary prerequisite for a
wrongful discharge action founded on public policy,218 and that a violation of
the covenant of good faith could be based on "objective manifestations by the
employer giving rise to the employee's reasonable belief that he or she has job
security and will be treated fairly."' 2 19 In Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hos-
pital220 the court held that the necessary "objective manifestation" could be
implied from an employee's inclusion in a benefit program reserved for "perma-
nent" employees, and reiterated that punitive damages could be awarded, even
though an alternate claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
had been dismissed. 22 1 In Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation22 2 the court upheld an award of $1.4 million in punitive damages to a
thirty-year employee discharged in 1980, and quoted with approval a California
decision adopting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all employment
contracts.22 3 Flanigan presented no public policy issues. Although the court
was divided over the size of the award, all the justices seemed to agree that
punitive damages were proper in the case.22 4 In Kerr v. Gibson's Products Co. of
Bozeman, Inc.22 5 the court approved an award of five years "front pay" to an
employee determined by a jury to have been wrongfully discharged.
22 6
217. 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984).
218. Id. at 1019.
219. Id. at 1020. Concurring specially, Justice Morrison argued there was no longer any need
under Montana law for a public policy exception, since the good faith requirement could be read into
all employment agreements. Furthermore, he would not require any "objective manifestation" from
the employer to make the good faith requirement operative. Id. at 1021-22 (Morrison, J.,
concurring).
220. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984).
221. Id. at 491-96.
222. 720 P.2d 257 (Mont.), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 564 (1986).
223. "'Termination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time [28 years]
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, includ-
ing employment contracts.'" Flanigan, 720 P.2d at 262 (quoting Cleary v. American Airlines, 111
Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)). In addition, the court identi-
fied two "objective manifestations" on which to imply the covenant: (1) longevity of service without
complaint by the employer; (2) employer's unilateral issuance of a company policy providing for
warnings and rehabilitation of unsatisfactory employees. Id.
224. The employer attempted to appeal this ruling to the United States Supreme Court, arguing
it was unconstitutional under the due process clause, the contracts clause, and the eighth amend-
ment to levy a huge punitive damage award against an employer for an action undertaken at a time
when the state's courts had npt yet recognized a tort action for discharge of an employee. The Court
rejected the appeal because the federal constitutional questions had not properly been presented to
the Montana courts. See Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Flanigan, 107 S. Ct. 564 (1986)
(mem.).
225. 733 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1987).
226. Kerr clarifies ambiguities from earlier cases on the circumstances under which the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing would be implied in law. Flanigan left unclear whether the court had
agreed to abandon the "objective manifestation" requirement of earlier cases, but Crenshaw sug-
gested the requirement would not pose a particularly severe burden on plaintiffs. In Kerr the court
found that promotions and pay increases made it "reasonable for [the employee] to believe that she
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The Montana cases, culminating in passage of a wrongful discharge statute
in 1987, provide at the same time a cautionary note and an example. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court refused to continue enforcing old doctrines it found incon-
gruent with modem circumstances. But in the absence of legislative guidance it
engaged in a trial and error approach which, while fascinating to legal scholars,
must have bewildered Montana employers and their counsel. The employer's
argument in appealing Flanigan to the United States Supreme Court-that the
rapidly developing caselaw could not have been anticipated when the discharge
in that case took place227-has some merit. Statutory changes are normally pro-
spective for such reasons.
Another objection to the Montana cases, as they developed, is the court's
continued reluctance to acknowledge it was really changing the underlying com-
mon-law rule for employment in Montana. By upholding the extraordinary
damage award in Flanigan, and more importantly, by virtually extending the
good faith obligation to all employment contracts, the court had in effect aban-
doned the at will presumption. Perhaps the court felt precluded from going
further by the existence of a statute which arguably embodied the at will rule.228
If that was the problem, it was solved by the subsequent enactment of legis-
lation ratifying most of what the court had done. In this sense, the Montana
court has provided an example for other state courts desiring to provoke legisla-
tive action. By extending developing common-law exceptions to their logical
extremes, a court may stimulate legislative attention to the problem in response
to the outrage expressed by employers.
As the nation's first wrongful discharge statute, the Montana law is likely to
become a model for others, so the manner in which it deals with employee termi-
nation is worth some discussion. The brief statute is in nine sections.229 The
legislature states its purpose in the second section as setting forth the rights and
remedies with respect to wrongful discharge, and providing that apart from the
rights and remedies set forth in the statute, employment in Montana is still to be
considered "at will" if it has "no specified term."'23
0
The third section provides definitions of "discharge," 23' "constructive dis-
charge" 232 and rather broad definitions of "employee" 233 and "fringe bene-
had job security and would be treated fairly." Id. at 1295. Consequently, the court apparently
would find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for an employee whose work had been
satisfactory, resulting in pay increases and promotions, over a period as short as five and a half years,
the length of Kerr's employment. Id. at 1293.
227. See Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Flanigan, 55 U.S.L.W. 3399 (Oct. 9, 1986) (No.
86-612) (summarizing issues presented).
228. "An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on
notice to the other, except where otherwise provided .... MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1987).
229. The first section merely states the short title of the law: "Wrongful Discharge From Em-
ployment Act." Id. § 39-2-901.
230. Id. § 39-2-902.
231. Id. § 39-2-903(2). "'Discharge' includes a constructive discharge as defined in subsection
(1) and any other termination of employment including resignation, elimination of the job, layoff for
lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and any other cutback in the number of employees for a
legitimate business reason." Id.




' 2 3 4 "Good cause," which is part of the standard for judging a discharge,235
is "reasonable, job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfacto-
rily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legiti-
mate business reason."' 236 Public policy is also defined: "a policy in effect at the
time of the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established
by constitutional provision, statute, or administrative rule."
'237
Section four establishes three causes of action for wrongful discharge. Sub-
section one creates an action for retaliatory discharges for "the employee's re-
fusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy.
' 2 38
This action encapsulates the main features of the public policy exception now
embraced in a majority of states.239 Subsection two creates an action on behalf
of employees who have passed "the employer's probationary period" if their
discharge "was not for good cause." 24° This action essentially replaces the at
will rule for nonprobationary employees with the equivalent of a just cause stan-
dard. Subsection three creates an action for discharges that violate the express
provisions of written personnel policies,24 1 essentially adopting the employee
handbook breach of contract theory now recognized in a majority of
jurisdictions.
242
The fifth section deals with remedies, and undoubtedly reflects a reaction to
the excessive punitive damages awarded in Flanigan and perhaps the front pay
award in Kerr. The basic remedy for wrongful discharge is "lost wages and
fringe benefits for a period not to exceed 4 years from the date of discharge,
together with interest thereon." An express mitigation duty can serve to reduce
the award.243 If the court finds that a discharge violates section 39-2-904(1), the
"public policy" cause of action, and the employer "engaged in actual fraud or
"Constructive discharge" means the voluntary termination of employment by an employee
because of a situation created by an act or omission of the employer which an objective,
reasonable person would find so intolerable that voluntary termination is the only reason-
able alternative. Constructive discharge does not mean voluntary termination because of an
employer's refusal to promote the employee or improve wages, responsibilities, or other
terms and conditions of employment.
Id.
233. Id. § 39-2-903(3). "'Employee' means a person who works for another for hire. The term
does not include a person who is an independent contractor." Id.
234. Id. § 39-2-903(4). "'Fringe benefits' means the value of any employer-paid vacation leave,
sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability insurance plan, life insurance plan, and pension benefit
plan in force on the date of the termination." Id.
235. Id. § 39-2-904(2).
236. Id. § 39-2-903(5).
237. Id. § 39-2-903(7).
238. Id. § 39-2-904(1).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 160-84.
240. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1987).
241. Id. § 39-2-904(3).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 107-30.
243. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1987). This damages measure is sufficiently ambiguous
to make it unclear whether the damage award is to be limited to the time between the discharge and
the judgment of the court, or whether, using the theory of the Kerr decision, it is actually an authori-
zation of up to four years "front pay." In Kerr the court relied on the Montana Commercial Code,
id. § 27-1-203, authorizing the award of damages for injury "certain to result in the future." Kerr,
733 P.2d at 1295.
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actual malice in the discharge of the employee," the court may award punitive
damages. 244 Any damages other than those specifically authorized by the stat-
ute are expressly ruled out.
245
The remaining provisions deal with administration of the wrongful dis-
charge action. Section 6 establishes a one-year statute of limitations246 and re-
quires that plaintiffs exhaust internal appeals procedures, when available, before
resorting to litigation. Employees, however, are excused from complying with
internal procedures if these are not brought to their attention within seven days
of the discharge. 247 Avoiding encroachment on existing statutory remedies and
preemption problems, section 7 provides that any discharge subject to state or
federal procedures for "contesting the dispute" or any discharge involving an
employee covered by a written collective bargaining agreement will not be cov-
ered by the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, and section 8 quashes
any claims for wrongful discharge founded on common-law tort or contract the-
ories. 248 Finally, section 9 authorizes employees and employers to agree to sub-
mit their discharge disputes to final and binding arbitration.249 To encourage
parties to arbitrate, section 9(4) provides that attorney's fees may be awarded to
a prevailing party whose offer to arbitrate was refused.250 Section 9 also pro-
vides that if the discharged employee makes an offer to arbitrate and wins the
arbitration, the costs of the arbitration will be paid by the employer.2 51 Submis-
sion of the dispute to arbitration terminates the right to litigate the discharge
under the Act, but the arbitrator's decision is subject to review under provisions
of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
252
The Montana statute deals creatively with many of the issues raised by the
problem of wrongful termination from employment. By providing incentives for
the parties to submit their disputes voluntarily to arbitration, the statute may
discourage the flood of lawsuits already burdening the courts and feared by
those who support the traditional rule. By providing a limited remedy, it should
discourage frivolous suits and provide a strong incentive for settlement. Indeed,
the statute might be seen as a form of compelled severance pay for wrongfully
discharged employees, because it does not make any provision for court-ordered
reinstatement, thus avoiding the problem of compelling an unwanted associa-
tion. Finally, by explicitly refraining from supplanting collective bargaining and
statutory remedies, the Montana statute preserves the role of unions in protect-
ing employee rights in organized workplaces, and leaves largely intact the ability
of the union to promote itself as a provider of services not otherwise available,
244. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1987).
245. Id. § 39-2-905(3).
246. Id. § 39-2-911(1).
247. Id. § 39-2-911(2), (3).
248. Id. §§ 39-2-912, -913. On the preemption point the statute is consistent with the Montana
Supreme Court's views on federal labor law preemption, as expressed in Anderson v. TW Corp., 741
P.2d 397 (Mont. 1987).
249. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1987).
250. Id. § 39-2-914(4).
251. Id. § 39-2-914(5).
252. Id. § 39-2-914(6).
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such as representation in grievance procedures and provision of counsel in con-
tested discharge cases.
III. WHY THE COURTS CAN AND SHOULD ABANDON THE AT WILL
PRESUMPTION
The foregoing history brings us to a time of confusion and uncertainty in
the law of employment termination from which the legislative branches of our
federal and state governments seem uninterested in extricating us. Assuming
that state legislatures will continue in their hesitancy on this subject and that
national legislation is unlikely any time soon, can and should the state courts
take the initiative to abandon the at will presumption, substituting new substan-
tive principles of employment law? The question whether the courts can take
such action must be answered before one addresses the question whether they
should.
When courts sit in cases not governed by statutes, they are expected to
apply rules of decision derived from a body of precedent. It is easy to forget in
an age dominated by legislation that the common-law courts of America have
always decided many cases not covered by statutes. Perhaps this judicial role
has atrophied as the traditional common-law areas have been increasingly codi-
fied, first by "restaters" and then by uniform law writers and legislators. Any
contention, however, that the common law should be frozen because we have
become increasingly accustomed to legislating solutions to society's problems
does not withstand careful examination.
At what point should common-law doctrine be frozen? Why should com-
mon-law developments governing termination of employment from a particular
period be treated with such heavy reverence, if many of the other common-law
doctrines of that period-including many governing employment-have fallen
by the wayside through legislative reform? Should legislative inertia automati-
cally be interpreted as continuing societal approval of a long-established doc-
trine, or might it be seen as a recognition that a particular problem is resistant to
legislative solution and perhaps best treated by the evolutionary processes of the
common law?
Dean Guido Calabresi has suggested that a significant role remains for the
common-law process. 253 He argues that when an old doctrine, whether con-
tained in a statute or a common-law rule, has become incongruous or archaic in
light of the "legal landscape" that has emerged since its adoption, the courts can
modify the doctrine in circumstances when legislatures have not recently spoken
affirmatively to preserve it.254 This role is justified by the unavoidable inertia in
a system which relies heavily on legislative consensus for lawmaking, resulting
in serious inconsistencies between more recently enacted policies and older stat-
253. G. CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 163-64.
254. G. CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 163-64. Dean Calabresi's argument centers on the role of
courts in dealing with antiquated statutes, but he extends his argument to the role of the courts in
updating antiquated common law doctrines. He recognizes that such a power should only be used
sparingly in extreme situations. See ch. 13, "The Dangers of the Doctrine," id. at 167-71.
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utes or common-law rules.2 5 5
The courts should not legislate in the sense of carving out new areas for
active promulgation of doctrine. Rather, they should play their traditional role
of modernizing existing doctrines to make them more congruent with other ar-
eas which have been the subject of recent legislative action.2 56 Some of the most
obvious leads in recent legislation which would justify the courts undertaking
this task have occurred in the area of employment discrimination law. This area
reflects an underlying legislative philosophy that employees should be judged
based on their job qualifications and performance rather than categorical classifi-
cations. A less obvious but philosophically more convincing lead is provided by
the unemployment compensation insurance schemes adopted by state
legislatures.
257
Unemployment legislation is essentially a cost-shifting mechanism. Some
part of the cost of discharge is shifted from the employee to the employer
through the experience rating system when a discharge is found to be due to
conditions beyond the control of the employee, such as adverse economic cir-
cumstances leading to job elimination, or unjustified discharges. 258 A cause of
action for unjustified discharge similarly can be seen as a cost-shifting device,
because by definition a plaintiff in such an action is alleging he was not at fault in
the discharge. Unemployment insurance does not fully shift the cost. It pro-
vides a subsistence bridge for discharged employees seeking new work,2 9 but
reflects a legislative recognition that long-time employees have some minimal
right to economic support when they lose their jobs. A similar sort of legislative
recognition underlies workers compensation laws, which require some em-
ployer-funded support for employees incapacitated by work-related injuries.
The minimal compensation provided by unemployment insurance schemes,
however, does not sufficiently compensate the wrongfully discharged employee
for her physical, temporal, and emotional investment in the job. Judicial initia-
255. G. CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 164-65.
256. Calabresi points to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) as an exam-
ple of this phenomenon in action. Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous court, adopted a new
federal common-law right of action for wrongful death in the absence of direct federal statutory
authority, noting that the traditional common-law doctrine against such causes of action had been
undermined by numerous state and federal enactments, making it "sharply out of keeping with the
policies of modem American maritime law." Id. at 388. Justice Harlan went on to comment: "It
has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative inno-
vations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law princi-
ples--many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions." Id. at 392. Thus, when a legislative
environment has rendered a common-law rule anomalous, a common-law court may be justified
under appropriate circumstances in revising the common-law rule to be consonant with that environ-
ment. For a more recent expression of this view of the common-law court's function, see Grisham v.
Hinton, 490 So. 2d 1201, 1208-09 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring).
257. I am indebted to my student research assistant, Ronald Gottlieb, for developing the follow-
ing analysis of the relevance of unemployment insurance as a "lead in legislation" for common-law
abrogation of the at will presumption, and what follows is to some extent paraphrased from a memo-
randum he wrote to me on this subject while assisting in research for this Article.
258. For a general description of the unemployment insurance system in the United States, see J.
HOGAN AND F. IANNI, AMERICAN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 536-48 (1956).
259. Id. at 546. Unemployment insurance benefits are not set at wage-replacing rates, for fear of
deterring recipients from seeking new employment. Id.
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tive in protecting these interests would not be a radical step for the courts, but
instead would be consonant with the underlying philosophy of unemployment
compensation as well as a developing societal recognition that noneconomic
losses, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, should be compensable.
My proposal for the appropriate remedial scheme--in essence, economic com-
pensation patterned on some of the voluntary severance pay systems now in
operation 26 ---is also consistent with this approach, noting that under unem-
ployment compensation, reinstatement is ordinarily not a remedy for wrongful
discharge.261 If unemployment compensation systems were redesigned to com-
pensate employees for a greater portion of their discharge-related losses, courts
would have less need to deal with this issue, except for instances when a dis-
charge involved independent torts calling for punitive damages.
Calabresi recognizes that the evolution of legislatures as the primary
sources of new law means such judicial action would be subject to legislative
correction.2 62 But he sees the process as a continuing dialogue between courts
and legislatures. When a court determines that the existing common law or old
statutory doctrine is severely out of line with other, more recently established
doctrine, it is appropriate for the court to send signals to the legislature through
its opinions, suggesting that they modernize statutes in the area in question.
Calabresi suggests that courts can take the next step if the message does not
provoke legislative consideration of the issue. The court can modify the doctrine
to conform more closely with related recent policy pronouncements of the legis-
lature, thus placing the ball in the legislature's court. If the legislature does not
agree with the need for such modification or prefers that it take a different form,
the legislature can overrule the court. This was done by the Montana legislature
when it adopted judicially-developed caselaw but imposed a more restricted ad-
ministrative and remedial scheme than was provided by the state's supreme
court.
2 6 3
It is in this spirit that I contend the courts can and should abandon the at
will presumption. If the courts determine that the at will presumption is incon-
sistent with the contemporary body of employment laws, and the legislatures
have not responded to the messages contained in the wholesale adoption of ex-
ceptions sapping the vitality of the rule, the courts would be justified in taking
the next step of doctrinal modification, substituting a doctrine they believe to be
more consistent with what the legislatures would do if they were to bring the law
of employment termination into line with the rest of employment law by statute.
A. Reasons for Abandoning the At Will Presumption
The reasons for abandoning the at will presumption divide into three main
areas: consistency with the overall substance of contemporary employment law,
260. See infra text accompanying notes 301-07.
261. M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 898-907 (1987). Indeed, if
termination was voluntary or justified, the former employee may not be entitled to benefits.
262. Id. at 164.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 229-52.
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economics, and fairness consistent with contemporary concepts of equality and
human rights.
1. The Consistency Argument
The at will presumption no longer accurately reflects the expectations of
most employees and employers with respect to the nature of their relationship.
The role of an evidentiary presumption is to provide a fallback position in the
absence of affirmative evidence of the intentions of parties, and to assist in allo-
cating the burden of proof with respect to such issues. In light of the legal land-
scape of employment law, most employees and employers likely do not presume
that termination decisions at all levels, whether rank-and-file, supervisory, or
managerial, should routinely be made without reference to job qualifications and
performance or, in the case of job elimination, valid economic factors.
Federal, state, and local employment statutes already require that the em-
ployer at least be able to "articulate" a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for terminating an employee whenever circumstances are such that an inference
of an impermissible motivation could be drawn.264 Furthermore, as Professor
Finkin has demonstrated, unlike the assumptions about longevity of employ-
ment held by employers and employees at the time the at will presumption was
adopted, today employers and employees normally presume that employment
which is not expressly undertaken for a limited time will be long-term, provided
some initial probationary stage is successfully completed, the employee's work
performance is satisfactory, the employee has done nothing to damage the em-
ployer's business or reputation, and the employer still requires performance of
the job at issue.265 Fringe benefits attaching to many employment relationships
confirm the assertion that neither employees nor employers regard "permanent"
employment as a relation casually entered or terminated.
266
The procedural due process revolution, while technically confined to gov-
ernmental decision making, has made an impression in the private sector as well,
first through collective bargaining and then through the administration of em-
ployment statutes which implicitly impose procedural regularity in a wide vari-
ety of circumstances. Consequently, most employees and employers likely
expect termination decisions to be carried out through regular procedures em-
bodying some rudimentary notion of fair process, and that the substantive basis
for such decisions relate to the employee's job performance and the employer's
economic needs. To the extent legal presumptions should reflect the reasonable
expectations of the persons to whom they apply, a presumption that termina-
tions can be made without justification or any regularity of process is no longer
supportable and is inconsistent with legislatively adopted policies relating to
other types of employment decisions. In workplaces where the employer has
promulgated written policies concerning discipline and termination procedures,
264. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
265. Finkin, supra note 26, at 736-743.
266. M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEbMAN, supra note 261, at 380-81 (tables demonstrating
proportion of workforce receiving various kinds of fringe benefits).
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a continued presumption of at will employment seems inconsistent with more
than merely the unspoken assumptions of the parties. The continued reluctance
of some state courts to recognize at least that the presumption has been rebutted
in such cases seems an indulgence in unnecessary legal fiction.
Some defenders of the at will presumption argue its abandonment would be
inconsistent with another fundamental concept of American law: freedom of
contract.267 They assert that it is contrary to the notions of liberty and free
association to require persons, including corporations, to remain in associations
involuntarily. Once a mutually consensual allegiance to the relationship breaks
down, either party should be able unilaterally to abandon it, with no need for
explanation or justification-provided, of course, that labor already performed
be properly compensated under the rubric of an executed contract. Considered
in isolation from the law surrounding employment which has developed during
this century, the freedom of contract argument seems highly persuasive. How-
ever, the law has moved too far from its nineteenth century antecedents for the
argument to carry much credibility.
Today, freedom of contract is circumscribed in almost every significant as-
pect of the employment relationship, on the ground that allowing personal pref-
erences and the market to reign freely with respect to employment endangers the
public welfare. From minimum wage, overtime, and child labor laws268 to
health and safety laws,2 69 from collective bargaining laws270 to laws regulating
fringe benefit plans,27 1 government has established floors and ceilings within
which the employment bargain must be struck. In addition, civil rights laws
sharply constrict the personal factors which may figure in a hiring, promotion,
or discharge decision. 27 2 In essence, society has determined that many aspects
of the employment relation have too many external ramifications to be left en-
tirely to a private bargain between an employer and an individual employee. To
be consistent, a defender of the at will presumption based on freedom of contract
must also advocate the repeal of much of the panoply of statutory employment
regulations. Not surprisingly, the most prominent such defender does advocate
such repeal.27 3 Thus the argument from freedom of contract is essentially senti-
mental. It is an attempt to clutch at the last vestiges of an older concept of
employment connoted by the traditional nomenclature of master and servant,
rooted in feudalism as transformed during the age of industrialization.
267. Probably the leading exponent of this view is Professor Richard Epstein. See Epstein, supra
note 38, at 953-55.
268. See, eg., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
269. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp.
1985).
270. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 &
Supp. 1985).
271. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp.
1985).
272. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp.
1985); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. 1985);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. 1985).
273. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983); see Power, supra note 128.
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Another aspect of the freedom of contract argument points to the availabil-
ity of job security through the selection of union representation. If employees
really desired job security, the argument goes, they would designate unions to
negotiate collective agreements on their behalf. By rejecting representation em-
ployees are said to have freely elected to be governed by the unregulated mar-
ket.2 74 A corollary argument is that extending just cause protection to
nonunion workers would further undermine the viability of the union move-
ment, because employment security is a valuable incentive which the movement
needs to organize more employees.
Both of these arguments fail to withstand serious analysis. Our labor law
creates a system in which union representation is normally available only if a
majority of the employees in a statutorily cognizable "bargaining unit" desires
representation by a particular union. 275 An individual employee cannot enjoy
the benefits of collective bargaining unless a majority of her fellow employees
share the desire for collective representation. Consequently, individual employ-
ees cannot fairly be charged with freely selecting at will status merely due to
failure to secure union representation. And, unions have had the selling point of
protection from arbitrary discharge for decades without making any significant
headway in increasing their share of the workforce, so it appears that to many
workers the promise of job security is not by itself a significant enough motiva-
tion to select representation, given any objections they might have to other as-
pects of unionism. 276
2. The Economic Argument
Some of the most outspoken supporters of courts' retaining the at will pre-
sumption resort to arguments about economic efficiency,277 but it is not clear
that retention of the presumption is necessarily good for the economy or, in the
274. See Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment at Will Rule, 5 INDIJS.
REL. L.J. 471 (1983) (arguing that employees who seek job security should resort to union organiza-
tion of their place of employment).
275. While a minority of employees may form a union and request bargaining, see Black Griev-
ance Committee v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985), an
employer is not obligated to bargain with a minority union and, in any event, may not bargain with
such a union with respect to terms and conditions of employment of those who are not its members.
National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982); see, e.g., Empo-
rium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). Furthermore, a mi-
nority union would not be protected in striking to compel new contract terms because the employer
is under no statutory obligation to negotiate with it in the first place.
276. Without describing in detail the various considerations of selecting a union representative,
one might note the waiver of certain statutory rights entailed in selection of a representative, the
submergence of individual economic interests to a common denominator, and the imposition of
union discipline and financial obligations. See Comment, The Contractual Waiver of Individual
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 793 (1986). Professor
Epstein concludes that the evidence is equivocal as to whether abandonment of the at will presump-
tion would benefit or disadvantage unions in their organizational efforts. Epstein, supra note 38, at
978-79.
277. Epstein, supra note 38, at 955-77. Professor Epstein's economic arguments have inspired
spirited rebuttal. Professor Finkin questions many of the factual assumptions on which the argu-
ments are based. Finkin, "In Defense of the Contract at Will"-Some Discussion, Comments and
Questions, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 727 (1985). Professor Minda challenges Epstein's economic model
as unsuitable to the nature of the employment relation, Minda, supra note 185, at 959-60.
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long run, the individual employer. A contrary presumption would give employ-
ers a strong incentive to improve the quality of their hiring process and manage-
ment and supervision of their workforces, and thus should not be presumed
detrimental to the profitability of their businesses or the competitiveness of the
American economy in world markets. Most of the industrialized economies
with which the United States competes already provide some measure of job
security through legislation or standard practice.2 78 There are ways to motivate
employees to produce without hanging a sword of Damocles-unjustified or un-
compensated termination-over their heads. Employee loyalty resulting from
expectations of long-term employment may be more beneficial in managing a
business enterprise than the implicit threat of unemployment.
Abandonment of an at will presumption does not necessarily mean all em-
ployees would be guaranteed continued employment regardless of their job per-
formance or the economic needs of the employer. 279 Whether the burden on the
employer is to prove just cause for discharge or merely to articulate a legitimate
and plausible reason for discharge, employees would still have to meet reason-
able standards of performance to keep their jobs. Under the British system, for
example, industrial tribunals determine whether an employee has been improp-
erly discharged. Employers' termination decisions may be sustained when legiti-
mately based on the economic needs of the company.280 While the just cause
standard as applied in American labor arbitration arguably may create too high
a barrier to the discharge of unsatisfactory employees, it is not the only alterna-
tive to the at will presumption and should not be set up as a straw man in the
debate about whether at will should be retained.
Another economic argument in support of maintaining an at will presump-
tion is that a system in which the employer need not explain termination deci-
sions, and employees may not appeal such decisions to a neutral forum,
minimizes transaction costs to both parties. 28 1 Because an unemployment insur-
ance system and, at least at some companies, a severance pay system, provide
discharged employees with a safety net to carry them through to a new job, at
will supporters argue that the company and the society need not be burdened
with the costs of litigating and compensating terminations.
It is true that transaction costs will accompany any requirement that termi-
nations be justifiable and subject to challenge in a neutral forum. However, such
transaction costs must be weighed against the benefits that might derive from
requiring rational decision making with respect to terminations, including the
potential benefits to business performance under a system which encourages pro-
278. At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170,
175-80 (1981) [hereinafter At- Will Employment] (summarizing legislative enactments in Europe, Ja-
pan, and Canada); W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 106-16 (1984).
279. For example, the Montana Supreme Court recently held that a discharge motivated by the
employer's economic situation did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
McClain v. NERCO, Inc., 738 P.2d 1285 (Mont. 1987).
280. At- Will Employment, supra note 278, at 175-76. Japanese courts also sustain a discharge for
a variety of reasons related to an employee's job performance and suitability for continued employ-
ment. W. GOULD, supra note 278, at 108.
281. Epstein, supra note 38, at 970-73.
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gressive discipline, improved supervision, and positive incentives for good per-
formance. In addition, costs certainly exist-perhaps not so easily calculable
but no less real than litigation costs-that fall upon the discharged employee
and his dependents and that are not adequately compensated by unemployment
insurance or severance pay. Even in workplaces not covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, employees' seniority on the job may have a distinct value for
a variety of prerequisites. 282 A discharged employee must start over somewhere
else without seniority. Employees who have accumulated substantial seniority
may encounter illegal but nonetheless real age-based discrimination in seeking
new employment, particularly new employment which is compensated at a level
comparable to the job from which they were dismissed. Furthermore, the psy-
chological impact of an unexplained termination, which may translate into
stress-induced health problems, must also be factored into the equation. 283 The
economic impact on companies of abandoning or retaining the at will presump-
tion is not the only impact to be considered, for retaining the presumption has
both an economic and noneconomic impact on employees and their dependents.
Consequently, economic considerations do not necessarily provide over-
whelming support for retaining the at will presumption, particularly if one
briefly shifts attention from theory to practice and observes that the courts are
now full of litigation about employee terminations, even though the at will pre-
sumption is still officially the common-law rule in almost every state. That the
small proportion of individuals who cannot already fit their case into one of the
existing legislative or common-law exceptions will create a massive flood of new
litigation seems unlikely, especially if remedies are appropriately tailored to be
truly compensatory rather than punitive. Furthermore, abandonment of the at
will presumption logically should deter employers from discharging employees
when they lacked the evidence to support a reasonable justification for the dis-
charge. Thus, the volume of discharge litigation might actually decrease over
the long term. If more employers adopted the progressive discipline and rehabil-
itation approaches common under just cause collective bargaining agreements,
combined with a policy of providing an explanation backed up by documenta-
tion to the discharged employee, the discharges that do take place would more
likely be perceived by employees as justifiable, further deterring litigation.
3. The Human Rights and Equality Argument
Another reason for abandoning the at will rule is that substituting a rule
more protective of employee interests in job security would be consistent with
the trend toward humanizing the workplace and advancing from the harsh con-
ditions of the industrialization period in American history. Society's concept of
282. M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 261, at 482-84.
283. Ravin, Unjustifiable Termination: A New Entity in the Private Practice of Forensic Psychia-
try, 8 AM. J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 2, 3 (1987). Dr. Ravin demonstrates the psychological and
physical consequences of unjust discharge in a series of case studies taken from his practice. Such
consequences are beginning to gain judicial recognition in employment discrimination cases. See,
e.g., Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 46 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 279 (9th Cir. 1988) (non-teaching assignment
for instructor with AIDS inflicts psychological injury which is irreparable).
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human rights, whether with respect to the government or to fellow citizens, has
advanced since the late nineteenth century. Many working conditions then com-
monplace would not be tolerated today. We have mandated a shorter workweek
and workday, a floor under economic compensation, 284 nondiscriminatory prac-
tices with respect to race, religion, and other characteristics, 2 85 appropriate ven-
tilation, sanitation and minimal health and safety requirements, 2 86 protections
for fringe benefits entitlements, 287 and the right of employees to combine for
collective action if they so desire.28 8 While a wide variety of particular justifica-
tions support each of these specific changes, a concern for basic human rights is
reflected in all of them. Together, they suggest a move toward a societal consen-
sus that each individual is eqtitled to be judged on the basis of individual effort
and ability, and to work in a reasonably safe and healthful environment for com-
pensation sufficient to provide for basic survival needs, even if she or he does not
command the bargaining power or skills to secure such conditions as an individ-
ual negotiator in the labor market. This overall trend of placing increased
weight on the rights of employees in balancing employer and employee interests
with respect to workplace regulation is continuing, even during a period when
deregulation seems to be the catchphrase of the hour. Recent legislation has
expanded protection against discrimination for the physically and mentally dis-
abled,2 89 required employers to allow dismissed employees to continue partici-
pating in employment-based group health insurance programs, 290 abolished
mandatory retirement on account of age,2 91 required unpaid childcare leave pol-
icies covering both parents,2 92 and mandated advance notification of plant
closures.
293
One aspect of the trend toward employee protection particularly relevant to
the issue of at will employment is the concept of equality of treatment. In termi-
nating an employee whose race, sex, age, religion, union activities, or other per-
sonal characteristics might lead to an inference of unlawful discrimination, an
employer may be required to " 'articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
284. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); 40 U.S.C. § 328 (1982).
285. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
286. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
287. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
288. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
289. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (1956) (state civil rights law amended to add protection
against handicap discrimination in employment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-13-1, -10 (1987)
(disability discrimination law extended to private sector employers); TENN. CODE ANN. § 850-103
(1986) (nondiscrimination requirement broadened to extend to discharges); Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105
(Supp. 1987) (the handicapped added to state Fair Employment Practices Law).
290. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, §§ 601-608, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-1168 (West
Supp. 1987).
291. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-592, § 2, 100
Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 631 (West Supp. 1987)).
292. Legislatures have enacted such requirements recently in Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode
Island. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.940-.941 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.360
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-2 (Supp. 1987).
293. ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 625-B.3.6 (Supp. 1987); see Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc.
v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
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son' " for the discharge. 294 No such legal requirement exists under an at will
regime for those employees whose personal characteristics or activities do not
place them in a statutorily protected group. While this justification requirement
was adopted to combat discrimination motivated by categorical prejudices, it
produces an anomaly in the law. Protecting the rights of certain employees to be
free of discrimination discriminates against employees who are not members of
protected groups because their interests in fair treatment and continued employ-
ment are accorded less recognition than employees who are members of such
groups. If some employees are entitled not to be fired without at least the articu-
lation of a legitimate reason, why should not all employees be so entitled? Par-
ticularly when one adds to the consideration public employees, who are entitled
to procedural and substantive protections by virtue of federal and state constitu-
tions and statutes,295 it is inconsistent with equality of treatment to deny at least
minimal protections against arbitrary discharge to the employees not so pro-
tected. To entitle all discharged employees to an explanation related to their
work performance or economic needs of the employer would level the playing
field as between different groups of employees. It would accord with contempo-
rary notions of respect for human dignity which underlie much of the evolving
statutory employment law.
B. Structuring a New Common-Law Presumption
Common-law courts operating on the principle that new rules must repre-
sent evolutionary rather than revolutionary changes from existing doctrine have
thus far dealt with this issue by recognizing exceptions to the old rule. These
exceptions may be characterized as special case doctrines because they deal with
particular circumstances in which it seems inappropriate to the court to apply
the traditional at will rule. The exceptions suggest the outlines for a new pre-
sumption which could simplify the process of decision, clarify the rights of em-
ployees and employers, and be consistent with existing statutory and
constitutional requirements.
The principal common-law exceptions recognized by state courts require
employers to follow their announced policies for discipline and discharge, to
refrain from discharging employees under circumstances that would undermine
articulated public policies, and in a small number of jurisdictions to deal with
their employees in good faith.296 The modem employment relationship suggests,
in its essential features, that such requirements are not at all foreign to the rea-
sonable expectations of most employers and employees when they enter such
relationships.
Let us take a typical employment relationship in which there is no written
294. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (quoting McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
295. See generally Developments in the Law, Public Employment, supra note 24 (provides a uni-
fied treatment of public employment law highlighting differences between public and private employ-
ment law).
296. As such, the judicially developed exceptions are virtually codified in MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-904 (1987), that provides:
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agreement and the only terms specified by the employee and employer are com-
pensation, work requirements, and everyday shop rules. Nothing has been said
or written between the parties regarding the exact duration or method of termi-
nating the relationship. Let us assume further that compensation for the job
includes, in addition to hourly wages, a stated intention by the employer to give
a certain number of days off with pay for holidays and vacations, health insur-
ance coverage, and contributions toward a pension, with entitlements to these
benefits phased in over time.297 Let us also assume that the employee is told
that some initial period of time is considered a probationary period, and that the
employee is not a member of a statutorily protected "minority group." Given
these circumstances, what would be reasonable for a court to presume with re-
spect to the parties' intentions on the issue of termination?
This typical constellation of facts suggests the parties expect their relation-
ship to continue so long as the job needs to be performed and the employee
performs it satisfactorily. The indicia of this unspoken understanding include
the employer's provision of health care and retirement benefits. Why would
such forms of deferred compensation be included in a relationship presumed to
be of brief duration, and terminable without notice for any or no reason? The
other forms of deferred compensation-holiday and vacation benefits-would
tend to confirm this understanding, for one would not expect an employer to pay
for time not worked, essentially an investment by the employer in human re-
sources, unless there was some understanding that the relationship was to be
long-term.
Indeed, any policies adopted by the employer which tend to induce em-
ployee allegiance and discourage employee turnover support a presumption that
the employer wants the relationship to be a continuing one.298 The more care
the employer puts into the hiring process, such as interviewing, checking refer-
ences, administering preemployment physical examifiations, and specifying a
probationary period, the more logical would be the presumption that the em-
ployer and the employee expected the relationship to be extended. If the em-
ployer stated expressly-particularly in a printed policy manual-that it would
not terminate the relationship without a specified reason, a presumption of a
continuing relationship is even more soundly based in fact.
The distinctions between employees and independent contractors, which lie
at the heart of employment law, tend towards the same presumption of longevity
A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy;
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the em-
ployer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.
297. As previously noted, most private sector employees enjoy some combinations of these types
of nonwage benefits in connection with theirjobs. M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, supra
note 261, at 380-81.
298. See Finkin, supra note 26, at 736-43. Professor Finkin persuasively shows how employers
have tried to reduce the cost of employee turnover by changing management policies to induce
increased employee loyalty and stability. Id.
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in the relationship. As distinct from an independent contractor, an employer
has an investment in the employee, reaping the benefits of the employee's in-
creased familiarity with the business over time and the loyalty induced by the
expectation that the relationship will continue. The profit-maximizing employer
seeks to encourage the employee in feeling that he has a common stake in the
enterprise, a common interest in improved productivity through innovation and
effort. This relationship is foreign to that of the independent contractor, which,
although it may be repeated between particular individuals or companies, is nor-
mally of a more ad hoc nature, with the parties primarily concerned with achiev-
ing a specified result for a specified price.
Consequently, it seems appropriate for courts topresume, if the parties have
not expressed themselves on the subject during the hiring process, that the par-
ties intend a typical employment relationship to be open-ended, curtailed only
when the job does not exist or the employee proves to be unsuitable for the job.
In this context, the lack of a lefinite duration is not a significant matter, because
it is simply irrelevant to the issue of method or reason of termination. Only two
issues are truly relevant: whether the employer requires the work to be per-
formed, and whether the employee is suitable to perform the work. With such a
presumption in place, any employee challenging a termination would be re-
quired to demonstrate to the satisfaction of an impartial third party that the job
continued after her dismissal and that she remained suitable for that job.
As with the current at will regime, a new presumption of extended employ-
ment would be rebuttable and could be avoided through express contract. If an
employer and employee freely entered into a relationship with the express under-
standing that it was terminable at the will of either party at any time without
explanation, or after a particular period of time had passed, and such an under-
standing could be proven by competent evidence, the presumption would be re-
butted and the employer would have no common-law duty to justify a
termination.299 If shown that the employment in question carried none of the
indicia supporting a presumption of extended employment, such as deferred
compensation (fringe benefits), and individualistic hiring criteria, the presump-
tion of extended employment would be weaker and easier to overcome with evi-
dence tending to show employee unsuitability, particularly if the dischargee had
been employed only briefly or was discharged during an initial probationary
period.
In a case governed by the unrebutted presumption of extended employ-
ment, an employer sued for wrongful discharge would have to state a plausible
reason for termination, relating to the quality of the employee's performance or
other employee behavior directly affecting the workplace. Employee behavior
outside the workplace which significantly lessened the employee's value to the
enterprise or made the employee unavailable for work when needed, such as
conviction of a crime entailing imprisonment, would justify a discharge, as
299. It would be a simple matter for employers to advertise openly such jobs as being at will, and




would convincingly documented production below the accepted norm in the
workplace, or serious customer dissatisfaction. Elimination of the work to be
performed would be an adequate defense, because the common law could not
require an employer to make an entrepreneurial decision under current limits of
private workplace regulation.
30°
As in any civil litigation when the plaintiff alleges an injury by the defend-
ant, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that a discharge was a
violation of the employment relationship should rest with the employee. How-
ever, the burden of establishing a credible justification for a discharge when the
employee presents convincing evidence that the job continued to exist and that
the employee was suitable to continue performing it should rest with the em-
ployer, who would be the party most likely to possess the information necessary
for proof on the issue, and whose action discharging the employee sparked the
litigation in the first place. Once an employer had established a justification for
a discharge, the employee would lose the case unless he could show that the
justification was in some way inadequate or unlawful.
C. The Remedial Problem
The way the caselaw has been developing complicates the problem of pro-
viding a suitable remedy for an unjustified discharge. Under the various excep-
tions to the at will rule developed in state courts, remedies can range from a
relatively small award of back pay reduced by other earnings of the former em-
ployee when liability is premised solely on a contractual theory, to punitive and
compensatory damage awards exceeding a million dollars when liability is pre-
mised on a tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy or an implied
obligation of good faith.30 1 No common-law court has yet imposed a reinstate-
ment remedy. Although it is likely many cases will be settled by the employer
agreeing to reinstate the employee or to make a cash settlement acceptable to the
employee, in that small percentage of cases that go to a verdict and determina-
tion that the employee was wrongfully discharged, a remedy is needed that
makes the employee whole without constituting a windfall that will stimulate
unduly speculative litigation.
30 2
The current rule in some jurisdictions under implied contract exceptions to
the at will rule, limiting the employee to lost pay subject to offset by earnings
from new employment or unemployment insurance benefits, does not seem ade-
quate to make the employee whole. The loss to the employee, especially an em-
ployee with significant seniority, is really more than lost wages and benefits. In
addition to emotional and psychological injuries attendant on an unjustified dis-
charge from employment, the employee loses seniority and status and possibly
300. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
301. An example of an extraordinarily large damages award is Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont.) ($1.4 million), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 564 (1986).
302. An example of the windfall problem can be found in Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C.
481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987), in which the jury awarded the plaintiff such a large amount for a dis-
charge in violation of an employee handbook policy that she would have no incentive ever to work
for the reminder of her life, in the view of the appellate court. See id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
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the ability to secure a particular level of entitlements with respect to fringe bene-
fits earned over time, particularly pension benefits. Although federal law re-
quires that pension benefits vest after a relatively short period of employment,
3 03
the actual value of vested benefits may be rather small if the employee is not able
to put in a large number of years under a company's pension plan. It seems
likely that an employee who works until retirement with one company may se-
cure a better benefit than an employee who works five- or ten-year periods at
several different companies. Consequently, compensatory damages need to be
above the loss in pay in order to make an employee whole for an unjustified
discharge.
On the other hand, in the absence of conduct by the employer that would
independently constitute a tort, the award of punitive damages does not seem
appropriate as a normal remedy for a discharge. Despite the characteristics that
separate it from other commercial transactions, an employment relationship is at
bottom contractual in nature, and the law has long recognized that contracting
parties should be able to buy their way out of disadvantageous contracts without
an excessive penalty. 3° 4 If an employer wishes to terminate an employment rela-
tionship without a reason legally sufficient to justify a discharge under the body
of law which would develop, the employer should nonetheless be able to termi-
nate the relationship provided the employee is reasonably compensated for his
losses. Not to allow for such an eventuality would violate the principle of liberty
that the defenders of at will employment stress. Finally, damage awards out of
all scale to the actual loss incurred by the employee undoubtedly will stimulate
speculative litigation, because employees who believe that their discharge was
inadequately compensated by severance pay or unemployment insurance benefits
will have a strong incentive to sue, and lawyers surely will be available to repre-
sent them on a contingency basis when the promised rewards are great.
Provision of reasonable severance pay for discharged employees could pre-
vent litigation and provide an appropriate measure of damage awards in dis-
charge cases. Severance pay represents an attempt by employers to compensate
employees for the losses resulting from termination of employment, and is fre-
quently calculated by a formula relating the employee's normal rate of pay to his
workplace seniority.30 5 It is most commonly awarded in situations in which
employees lose their jobs due to economically dictated reductions in force, but
could well be adapted to all situations of involuntary termination. If the formula
voluntarily adopted for severance pay for managerial or clerical employees by
303. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053 (West Supp. 1987).
304. The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the
promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves
him free from interference until the time for fulfilment has gone by, and therefore free to
break his contract if he chooses.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1923); see also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3 (1982)
(economic aspects of contract enforcement).
305. Professor Finkin briefly summarizes the severance pay situation in a consideration of Pro-
fessor Epstein's article on at will employment. Finkin, supra note 277, at 756-58. He finds most
severance plans are limited to one or two weeks of pay, but that those adjusting for long-term service
may provide a week or more of pay for each year of service. Id.
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larger companies, plus lost pay up to the time of trial, became the standard for
awarding damages in wrongful discharge litigation, more employers might adopt
severance pay policies. The application of such policies might deter much litiga-
tion, because litigants could not gain more by suing unless they could prove
tortious conduct, and their attorney's fees could not be awarded by the court in
the absence of statutory authorization. 30 6 Reinstatement should generally not
be available as a remedy in a common law action challenging a discharge, for
many of the same reasons underlying the common law tradition of not ordering
specific performance of personal service contracts.30 7 The human relationships
involved would make forcible return of the employee to the workplace an unde-
sirable solution to the discharge problem when the discharge has been litigated
and supervisors or other employees are drawn in as witnesses against the dis-
charged employee. If the potential monetary damages are sufficient to en-
courage settlements, consensual reinstatements may materialize, but forcible
reinstatements are not conducive to a productive workplace atmosphere.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolving law governing the employment relationship has rendered the
at will presumption obsolete, but almost all legislatures have failed to modernize
the law governing employment terminations to bring it into consonance with the
surrounding employment law environment. The courts have been left to strug-
gle with an increasing volume of wrongful discharge litigation brought by for-
mer employees whose expectations differ sharply from the nineteenth century
ideology embodied in the old common-law presumption. Lacking direct legisla-
tive guidance and perceiving that application of the traditional presumption is
increasingly inappropriate, the courts have developed a variety of exceptions on
a piecemeal basis, producing significant differences in the law governing em-
ployee termination in the different states and complicating the management of
personnel in an interdependent national and international economy.
These circumstances justify the courts in rethinking the common-law pre-
sumption and restructuring it to reflect the contemporary employment law set-
ting. A presumption consistent with employee and employer expectations would
require employers to advance a plausible reason for termination when an em-
ployee could show that the job continued to exist and the employee was qualified
to continue performing it, and would award suitable make-whole damages if
threatened litigation could not be settled. If the new presumption did not meet
with legislative approval, the legislatures or Congress would be free to legislate a
306. In his defense of employment at will Professor Epstein argues that the existence of sever-
ance pay as a widely available benefit justifies maintaining the current rule. Epstein, supra note 38, at
967. Professor Epstein's assumption about how widespread such benefits are has been challenged.
See Finkin, supra note 277, at 755-57. If severance pay at a level sufficient to compensate employees
for their actual losses through discharge were as widely available as Epstein assumes, it seems un-
likely that there would be so much wrongful discharge litigation.
307. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16-5 (3d ed. 1987); E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 304, §§ 12.4-.7.
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different solution to the problem of job termination, as at least one state legisla-
ture already has done.
